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ABSTRACT 
The citizen legislator is both a controversial and recurring phenomenon of interest in 
political science research. A longstanding concern for the discipline has been whether or 
not involvement of the public in the lawmaking process is an asset or a liability to quality 
governance. This study explores the desirability of citizen legislating in the American 
states. A four dimensional index is created that includes empirical indicators of 
“substantive” and “procedural” governance. These indicators include voter turnout, fiscal 
health, the ideological distance between government and the citizenry, and the diversity 
of a state’s interest group system. The total number of initiatives and popular 
referendums that appear biennially within each of the fifty states is employed as the key 
explanatory variable to capture the degree of citizen legislating that is occurring in the 
states between 1980 and 2000. A random-effects generalized least squares regression 
reveals that higher ballot measure counts are statistically and substantively associated 
with better quality governance, indicating that citizen legislation is a quality input into the 
political system. Key control variables such as divided government, interparty 
competition, citizen ideological extremism, state legislative term limits, and legislative 
professionalism also tell particularly poignant stories about the road to good governance.  
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 “It is the power of the public which bears the name sovereignty, and sovereignty cannot 
be alienated. Legislative power belongs to the people, and can only belong to it alone.  
Be yourselves the authors of laws which are to fashion your happiness!” 
- Jean Jacques Rousseau, On Social Contract 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Who should govern? The issue of rule has found its way into the core of ancient 
as well as modern political theory in addition to the frequent spotlight it is afforded in 
contemporary research. Implicit in the question of who governs is the sought after end 
game: Good governance. Good governance is not immediately definable. Rather, for the 
purpose of analysis, it may be more readily identifiable by its symptoms than its 
theoretical essence. Governance itself is a process, not a simple policy output that is 
readily quantified. Political theory, however, instructs that the system of governance will 
fall under two dimensions. These dimensions give rise to empirical indicators. 
Specifically, a synthesis of ancient and modern conceptions of good governance 
necessitates both “substance” and “procedure” (Rousseau [1762] 1988; Plato [360 
B.C.E.] 1997; Habermas 1998; Dahl 2005; Rawls 2005). The “substantive” component of 
good governance includes tangible policy or electoral outcomes and is the focal point of 
Plato ([360 B.C.E.] 1997) and John Rawls (2005). Through the state of a union (its 
policies and their consequences), one is afforded a look at the substance of governance. 
In contrast, the “procedural” aspect asserts that governance is made good through the 
process of citizen inclusion (Rousseau [1762] 1988; Habermas 1998). That is, efficacy 
and inclusive participation lend legitimacy and thus goodness to the state of governance 
Through the degree of political inclusiveness that is granted to a citizenry we are offered 
a glance into the procedural component. 
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As the question of governance is ultimately a question of rule, the succeeding 
inquiry is: Under whose rule can good governance best be attained? The roles of the 
executive as enforcer and judiciary as arbitrator have achieved near unanimous 
agreement in contemporary political thought (Rousseau [1762] 1988; Habermas 1998; 
Rawls 2005). The role of the legislative branch, whose duties are most closely associated 
with active rule, remains in question.  
There are two theoretical ideal-types offered as the “best” means of attaining 
quality legislation, and by extension good governance: 1) legislation by knowledgeable 
elites (Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Burke [1770] 1999) or 2) citizen legislators (Rousseau 
[1762] 1988). Because the fusion of ancient and modern conceptions of proper 
governance necessitates the attainment of both substance and procedure, legislation by 
knowledgeable elites loses initial credibility; as it ranks demonstrably lower on the 
procedural component of good governance. This is due to less immediate public 
inclusiveness in the legislative process.  
In contrast, citizen legislating is the very definition of legislative inclusiveness. 
Thus citizen legislating helps to beget the procedural component of good governance. 
Conflicting evidence abounds, however, as to whether citizen rule is associated with 
positive or beneficial “substance” (Bone and Benedict 1975; Lascher, Hagan, and 
Rochlin 1996; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Camobreco 1998; Tolbert 1998; Campbell 
2001; Tolbert et al. 2003; Matsusaka 2008). In fact, this is among the most prevalent 
criticisms of citizen legislating. It is argued that the public is, on average, ill informed and 
unprepared to make good public policy choices (Cupps 1977; Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; 
Cronin 1989; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Ellis 2001). Consequently, this study aims to 
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explore a longstanding quandary: What relationship exists between citizen legislating and 
good governance? 
Beyond the obvious theoretical considerations, investigating the effects of citizen 
initiated legislation is of central importance to contemporary political science. Over the 
years, numerous studies have questioned the importance of, and identified the lack of, 
citizen education and citizen political knowledge (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Rosenstone 
and Hansen 2003). More specifically, how much education and knowledge is necessary 
in order to “vote correctly” (Lau and Redlawsk 1997)? Scholars have investigated which 
background characteristics make people more or less likely to vote or demonstrate high 
levels of political understanding (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 2003). Some have gone so far as to try and predict what a “fully informed voter” 
might look like in terms of preferred policy choices (Althaus 1998). Furthermore, 
research has explored the differences between “easy” and “hard” issue voters and the 
respective implications for elections and policy outcomes (Carmines and Stimson 1980).  
On some level, these inquiries are questions over the proper role that the citizenry 
should play in order to attain a better governing process. That is, even among much of the 
literature that appears to be unrelated to the question of “who should govern,” there is an 
implicit consideration of citizen participation and the relationship it has with quality 
governance. The notion of good governance is a near-universal and international concern, 
as evidenced by the recent efforts of the World Bank to quantify the construct; primarily 
as an informational beacon for international relations and business transactions.1    
                                                 
1 Notably, the World Bank also adheres to the theoretical conception of governance as being both 
substantive and procedural. Through survey data, it employs estimates of the “soundness” of a country’s 
policies (substantive) and the means by which elected officials enter into and exit from office (procedural). 
However, it is important to note that the World Bank’s Governance index is not particularly appropriate in 
 3
The question arises; how best to operationalize citizen legislating? In the 50 
American states, citizens legislate through the initiative and popular referendum. In their 
most common form, initiatives are citizen-proposed amendments to a state constitution. 
However, the initiative process may also be used to propose new statutes. In essence, 
initiatives are ballot measures that propose entirely new pieces of law and fall outside of 
the traditional legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government (Initiative and 
Referendum Institute 2007). A popular referendum, on the other hand, refers to the means 
by which citizens may propose amendments to or reject an existing statute within a state 
(Zimmerman 2001).2  
A third form of citizen political involvement come in the form of the legislative 
amendment. Legislative amendments are allowed in all 50 states and allow a state’s 
legislature to propose constitutional or statutory reform that is placed before voters on a 
statewide ballot in much the same manner as initiatives. This third type of citizen 
involvement, however, is a type of direct legislation that is not initiated by citizens and 
consequently it is not citizen legislating in the strictest sense. Political elites may employ 
this process to create a façade of citizen involvement when the true goal may be to use 
direct legislation as a means of passing the buck onto the public for potentially risky 
public policy decisions that they themselves fear being held accountable for (Gross 
2004). Alternatively, legislators may only propose amendments that have enough support 
                                                                                                                                                 
the study of direct legislation. First, even from a comparative perspective, direct legislation is primarily a 
sub-national phenomenon. World Bank index values vary only by country. Thus, many influences of 
citizen legislation would be lost, and the levels of analysis mismatched. Second, World Bank data does not 
begin until 1996. Much of the good that can be garnered from a time-series analysis is lost. For these 
reasons, I develop a wholly new measure of quality governance, one that is more suited to the study of 
direct legislation. World Bank Governance data is available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,menuPK:232599~pagePK:64133170~piPK:64133498~theSitePK:239419,00.htm. 
2 See John Zimmerman (2001) for a detailed account of how the contemporary popular referendum evolved 
from a more primitive town-hall based protest vote against extant legislative statutes.  
 4
in the public to pass, essentially reducing the process to a means of legitimizing a policy 
platform (Gerber et al. 2001; Gross 2004). Hence the legislative amendment should not 
necessarily be categorized with the other more purist forms of citizen legislative 
involvement. The focus should be on citizen initiated legislation, and in the end, only 
initiatives and popular referendums that reach a statewide ballot will be included in the 
empirical component of this analysis. Arguably, such measures are proffered by 
sufficient public support in the meeting of ballot access signature requirements and may 
wield agenda-setting influence regardless of passage rates (Gerber 1999).3 
There is a near perfect split in the number of American states which allow some 
combination of the initiative and popular referendum; effectively serving as an innate 
comparative laboratory. Moreover, the 27 states that allow citizen initiated legislation 
vary extensively in their use of these forms of direct democracy. Figure 1 demonstrates 
this variation, which is credited to a number of institutional factors including the required 
signature thresholds for ballot access, single-subject rules, as well as caps placed on the 
number of initiatives and referendums that can appear on a ballot each year. 
                                                 
3 Elisabath Gerber (1999) calls this potential power of agenda-setting the “threat of initiative”. 
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                 Figure 1: Total Initiative and Popular Referendum Use by State 
          
 
Ultimately, the influences of citizen legislating will be evaluated against four 
indicators; each pointing to some part of contemporary good governance. The key 
explanatory variable will be a state’s biennial ballot measure count.  With this measure of 
citizen legislating in hand, this study sets out to investigate the relationship between 
direct democracy and indicators of substantive and procedural good governance. The 
indicators include; 1) voter turnout measured as the percent of a state’s voting-eligible 
population that turns out to vote (see McDonald and Popkin 2001); 2) state fiscal health 
measures as the level of a state’s annual year-end reserves (see Eckl 2007; Initiative and 
Referendum Institute 2007); 3) greater diversity in interest representation approximated 
 6
by the percent of total registered interest groups within each state that can be classified as 
citizen groups (see Gray and Lowery 1996; Boehmke 2005a); 4) and last, the ideological 
distance between the government and its electorate (see Berry et al. 1998) with lower 
values indicating better quality governance. In the end, these four measures are combined 
to form the State Good Governance Index (SGGI).4   
In accordance with systems theory, citizen legislation serves as one of many 
potential inputs that enter the political system. Subsequently, the system engenders both 
institutional and policy outputs which influence the political environment; the 
environment cyclically proceeds to mold a new slate of inputs (Easton 1971). The 
question at hand becomes does citizen legislation serves as a “quality demand” (Easton 
1971). That is, does direct democracy play a noticeable role in the big picture of quality 
“substantive” and “procedural” governance?  Moreover, what are some of the tangible 
implications of demos kratos? And broadly, what does this mean for good governance? 
Building on existing literature, and employing this study’s findings in further inquiry, it 
may become possible to systematically develop answers to longstanding questions 
concerning the desirability of citizen legislating.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The methodology underlying the SGGI is detailed in the Research Design.  
 7
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Extant research suggests that citizen legislation has noticeable effects on both the 
state and society (Matsusaka 1995; Camobreco 1998; Gerber 1996a; 1996b; 1999; 
Braunstein 2004; Boehmke 2005a).5  The literature covers a myriad of research questions 
spanning from the influence of ballot measures on voter turnout (Smith 2001) and citizen 
political knowledge (Smith 2002; Smith and Tolbert 2007; 2006; 2004) to its impact 
upon state budgets (Cronin 1989; Matsusaka 1992; 1995; 2008; Clingermayer and Wood 
1995; Thatcher 2008) and government responsiveness to public opinion (Gerber 1996b; 
Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). The norm is to examine citizen legislating 
piecemeal, testing its influence on specific topics such as state spending, voter turnout, 
citizen political efficacy, and the likelihood of certain public policies, such as Indian 
gaming laws, being implemented within the states.  Given the sheer volume of research 
on citizen legislation it is not difficult to encounter contradictory findings.6 Indeed, 
conflicting evidence pervades on the fundamental issue of the desirability of citizen 
legislating. Most importantly, for this research, there has been little success settling this 
debate.  Nor, is there a concerted effort to tie direct legislation to a holistic theoretical 
construct such as good governance. 
Prior work has varied in its conceptualization of direct legislation (see Banducci 
1998; Gerber 1999; Boehmke 2002; 2005a; 2005b). Most frequently, scholars have 
investigated its effects as a specific institutional arrangement that exists in some of the 
                                                 
5 For the purposes of this study, the terms “direct legislation” and “citizen legislation” will be used 
interchangeably. Additionally, each term references the citizen initiative or popular referendum in the 50 
American states unless otherwise noted. 
6 For an example of such contradictory findings, see the sub-topic literature concerning the relationship 
between direct legislation and government responsiveness to public opinion (Matsusaka 1992; 1995; 
Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001).  
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American states but not in others. The institutional consideration is usually 
operationalized as a dichotomous variable, which denotes whether or not the initiative 
process is available in a state (Tatalovich 1995; Donovan and Bowler 1998a; Schildkraut 
2001; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Boehmke 2005a). Moreover, a majority of studies have 
limited the operational scope of citizen legislating to include only initiatives (Gerber 
1996b; Banducci 1998; Cain and Miller 2001; Boehmke et al. 2006); at the expense of 
popular referendums which are an alternative form of citizen policy making (Initiative 
and Referendum Institute 2008).7 
Studies to date that have investigated citizen legislating cluster under two general 
theoretical orientations. First, there are inquiries which question the legitimacy of direct 
legislation from the vantage points of a resource bias (where the campaign that expends 
the most resources wins the ballot race)8, democratic norms (such as deliberation and 
accountability),9 and the public’s ability or competency to make public policy 
decisions.10 In the second instance, scholars have focused on discerning the tangible 
influences of the initiative process on the citizenry (Smith 2001a; 2002; Alexander 2002; 
Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003; Braunstein 2004; Boehmke 2005a; 2005b), 
government (Matsusaka 1995; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Donovan and Bowler 
1998b; Garrett 1999; Gerber 1999; 2001; Alexander 2002), and public policy (Bone and 
Benedict 1975; Tatalovich 1995; Cain and Miller 2001; Schildkraut 2001; Boehmke and 
Witmer 2004; Matsusaka 2005; 2008); that is, what are its observable accomplishments 
                                                 
7 Of the 27 states that allow some form of direct legislation, only two (Florida and Mississippi) do not 
currently have the popular referendum process available.  
8 Cupps 1977; Cronin 1989; Schmidt 1989; Hadwiger 1992; Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Ellis 2002; 
Braunstein 2004; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004. 
9 Jones 1938; Magelby 1984; Warren 1993; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Ellis 2001, 133, Gerber et al. 
2001; Natelson 2001; Smith 2002. 
10 Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Lupia 2001; Lupia and Johnston 
2001; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004. 
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within the context of government and society? Many of these research questions are 
predated by studies which question the fundamental worth of citizen legislating. 
 
The Legitimacy of Direct Legislation 
 The legitimacy of citizen legislating have been questioned because of an alleged 
“resource bias” (Gerber 1999, Ch. 1). The resource bias suggests that money plays a 
prominent role in determining which ballot measures pass and are thus implemented as 
public policies (Owens and Wade 1986; Hadwiger 1992; Gerber 1999; Nicholson 2003). 
Specifically, the resource bias holds that due to the dearth of citizen political knowledge, 
initiative votes can be bought (Camobreco 1998; Cain and Miller 2001; Ellis 2002). All 
measures must have a sponsoring committee or group (Braunstein 2004), and the 
resource bias argues that the side which expends the most resources, primarily money, 
will win the ballot measure campaign (Gerber 1999, Ch. 1; Alexander 2002). At its core, 
the resource bias is rooted in the Populist Paradox which references the recurring concern 
that direct legislation is controlled by deep-pocketed special interests (Gerber 1999).11 
Ultimately, the theory is rooted in fundamental suspicion of the citizen legislator, positing 
that both ballot access and electoral success can be bought through advertisement and 
attractive ballot measure titling (Price 1975; Lund 1998; Ellis 2001, 150) 
This purported bias has served as the primary foundation for critics of direct 
democracy in the states who assert that citizen legislation, by its very nature, cannot work 
in the interests of good governance. The resource bias offers a potentially fatal blow to 
                                                 
11 This is noted as a paradox given the history of ballot measures in the states; they have traditionally been 
credited as a “progressive” phenomenon that emerged as a public reaction to the perceived infiltration of 
state governments by exclusive economic groups in the early 1900’s (Schmidt 1989; Alexander 2002; 
Braunstein 2004). 
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advocates of the citizen legislator. If votes and thus policy outcomes are bought and sold 
to the highest bidder, this bodes ill for quality governance. At its core, the theory asserts 
that the legitimacy of citizen legislating is compromised by special interests. 
 Investigations of the resource bias are rooted in case studies of salient initiatives 
in states that have historically kept quality financial records. Within such works, a 
number of observed ballot measure campaigns have been won by the side that expended 
the most resources, specifically the most money (Cronin 1989, 215). However, a 
methodological criticism should be noted. There are likely significant unit effects present 
that go uncorrected by the very nature of these research designs. States such as Colorado 
and California are noted for detailed financial record keeping, over a considerable length 
of time, for ballot measure campaigns. Thus, these cases are the ones employed to test the 
resource bias. However, states which employ sufficient financial record keeping are 
likely to differ significantly from those states that keep less fastidious records. Moreover, 
initiatives featured in case studies also tend to be highly salient (Gerber et al. 2001; Ellis 
2001; 2002) and there is little reason to believe that the most salient initiative cases are 
representative of all direct legislation. Consequently, the generalizability of such case 
study driven conclusions is limited.12  
Furthermore, researchers examine polling results from both the General Social 
Survey (GSS) and the American National Elections Studies (ANES) to gauge public 
sentiment on specific ballot measures and direct democracy, more generally.  Ellis (2002) 
finds that while the public consistently expresses skepticism towards the government and 
                                                 
12 In a study of the initiative and referendum laws in the states, Richard Ellis (2002) reports a fundraising 
“asymmetry” between candidate campaigns and ballot measure drives (45). While stringent financial 
reporting laws currently limit the amount of money legally donated to political candidates, there are 
virtually no such caps on what individuals or interested groups may donate to an initiative or referendum 
committee (Ellis 2002, 44-7). 
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politicians, the same distrust is not applied to the “will of the people” (125). Citizen 
initiatives and popular referendums are viewed as an extension of the public’s political 
acumen (Ellis 2002, 125). Subsequently, the electorate may not approach ballot measures 
with the same discrimination reserved for government sponsored legislation or political 
candidates (124-5). Conceivably, this may exacerbate the problem of the resource bias. If 
the public does in fact approach direct legislation with less caution and less suspicion, 
this may further public susceptibility to advertising, manipulative initiative or referendum 
titling, and attractive summaries that appear on the ballot (Gerber 1999; Ellis 2002).  
Attempts to discredit the resource bias have centered on falsifying its primary 
tenet; that deep-pocketed economic interests have captured the process. Research, 
however, has found that citizen groups have historically had better luck in placing 
initiatives on the ballot than have economic groups. Moreover, citizen groups are also 
more successful in passing their sponsored ballot measures (Gerber 1996a; Gerber 1999; 
Braunstein 2004).13 This has been credited to the excess personnel resources typically 
wielded by such groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Alexander 2002).14 That is, the 
power of citizen groups appears to be a function of their ability to mobilize the public 
(Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004). Since the proliferation of these organizations in the 
1970’s, scholars propose that money may be weighted less heavily in today’s ballot 
measure campaigns than it has in decades past (Braunstein 2004).  
                                                 
13 A “citizen” group references a non-professional organization that is affiliated with either a particular 
ideology, government, or policy goal (Alexander 2002); whereas the term “economic” denotes either trade 
groups, businesses, or a professional associations, each of which is concerned with a specific economic or 
financial end (Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002).  
14 Furthermore, scholars have acknowledged that only a minority of the economic groups within a state 
actually possess the monetary resources needed to wage a successful campaign and would in fact have a 
resource bias (Gerber 1999).  
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Not only do citizen groups tend to be more adept at mobilizing public support for 
a measure, but such groups also differ from economic groups in the types of measures 
they place on the ballot (Alexander 2002; Braunstein 2004). Citizen groups tend to 
sponsor “inclusive” measures (Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Braunstein 2004). An 
inclusive initiative or popular referendum implies that there is potential for the entire 
statewide constituency to be affected by the proposed legislation (Gerber 1996a; 1999).15 
This is contrasted with “exclusive” measures which impact only specific industries or 
organizations within the state.16 Scholars note that inclusive measures are significantly 
associated with citizen group sponsorship whereas exclusive measures tend to be the 
mark of economic interest groups (Gerber 1996a; Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004). If most 
ballot measures are inclusive in scope, this would provide some preliminary evidence that 
citizen legislation may be positively associated with the quality of governance within the 
states. 
Moreover, the influence of direct legislation is not limited to instances when the 
measures pass. That is, the threat of an initiative may stimulate greater governmental 
responsiveness to citizen demands for public policy (Gerber 1996a). Through a national 
survey of registered lobbying organizations (both economic and citizen groups), 
Elisabeth Gerber (1996a; 1999) finds that interest groups may care less about winning a 
ballot measure campaign than they do about influencing the state agenda by raising 
public awareness. Gerber’s findings appear to undermine the applicability of the resource 
                                                 
15 For instance, initiatives centering on state class-size reduction or English as the official state language 
qualify as inclusive measures. 
16 An example of an exclusive measure would include Florida’s infamous Amendment 10, the “pregnant 
pig” amendment, which prohibited the “mistreatment” of pregnant pigs by confinement to the small cages 
used as holding pens for the animals. It is noteworthy that exclusive initiatives or referendums tend to have 
lower passage rates, on average, than inclusive ballot items (Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004). 
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bias argument. First, citizen legislating appears to be dominated by non-economic groups. 
And when government is perceived to be unresponsive, citizen groups mobilize to 
threaten sponsorship of direct legislation on the matter (Gerber 1999). The very threat of 
a ballot measure may be sufficient to engender preemptive responsiveness from the 
government, specifically state legislatures (Gerber 1999). With the advent of greater data 
availability and survey methods, scholars are discovering that citizen legislation does 
appear to be citizen controlled, and money may play a much less “nefarious” role than 
critics have historically alleged (Gerber 1999; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 463). 
 While many criticisms of direct legislation center on a quantifiable resource bias, 
more qualitative considerations have been made as well. Several scholars have charged 
that the initiative and referendum are in violation of multiple democratic norms (Donovan 
and Bowler 1998b; Cain and Miller 2001). One criticism is that ballot measures are 
drafted in isolation and not subjected to the mediating influences of public debate or 
compromise (Cain and Miller 2001; Alexander 2002). It is noted that while direct 
legislation is most commonly initiated by citizen groups, it is not uncommon for the 
sponsoring group to disband following the passage or rejection of a ballot measure 
(Boehmke 2002; 2005a). This, in turn, creates another concern; namely who will be held 
accountable or bear responsibility for the impact of any policy change that may have 
occurred. Citizens, after all, cannot be voted out of office.  
Moreover, ballot measures lack official partisan identification. It is alleged that 
when combined with abstruse summary wording, the dearth of voting cues or heuristics 
may befuddle voters. Critics charge that the public must frequently rely upon one-sided 
campaign messages to extrapolate meaning from ballot summaries. Notably, only a 
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handful of states require even partial feasibility studies before measures are placed on the 
ballot (Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Alexander 2002; Initiative and Referendum Institute 
2008). Thus, more often than not, the typical ballot summary reads more like an enticing 
advertisement than a serious policy elaboration with both advantages and drawbacks 
noted (Alexander 2002). In general, critics suggest little emphasis is placed upon 
democratic discourse or dialogue, and this is perceived as troublesome for democratic 
norm adherence (Donovan and Bowler 1998b; Cain and Miller 2001; Alexander 2002).  
According to critics, direct legislation which is often championed as a means of 
imposing government accountability may, itself, lack accountability.  It is implied that 
citizen legislators inherently lack the capacity to effectively rule, are not held 
accountable, and that the result is bad public policy (Cain and Miller 2001). In fact, by 
violating democratic values of public disclosure and openness, scholars have charged that 
direct legislation is ultimately a roadblock towards achieving good governance (Donovan 
and Bowler 1998b; Cain and Miller 2001).  However, recent empirical research suggests 
otherwise (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).  
The counter argument is that because an initiative or referendum does not have 
official political party support or a traditional voting heuristic this does not mean that the 
public is incapable of making meaningful associations (Lupia 1994; 2001). All ballot 
measures require a group’s sponsorship. And most citizen groups have recognizable 
agendas and ideologies (Gerber 1999; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004). This vein of research 
suggests that voters are in fact able to employ decision-making heuristics on ballot 
measures based upon evaluations of the sponsoring and opposing committees (Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998; Lupia 2001; Lupia and Johnston 2001; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004, 
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468-9). Thus, the public may not be as wildly incompetent on deciding public policy 
matters as critics initially charge. 
 
 The Effects of Direct Legislation 
 While many studies have inquired as to whether or not citizen legislation has been 
compromised by a resource bias or is inconsistent with democratic principles a host of 
additional research has opted to explore the observable effects of the initiative process. 
Indeed, the bulk of initiative and referendum literature inquires as to what effects direct 
legislation has upon the state and society. For instance, strong connections have been 
uncovered between the initiative process and voter turnout, citizen political knowledge, 
and interest group membership (Smith 2001; Smith and Tolbert 2004; Boehmke 2005). 
Research suggests the presence of a citizen initiative or popular referendum on a 
ballot may boost voter turnout by nearly four percentage points during midterm elections 
(Gerber 1999; Smith 2001; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). Moreover, exposure to 
these ballot measures over time appears to lend itself to higher overall levels of political 
knowledge within the state citizenry (Smith 2002). Participating in direct legislation also  
appears to allow the public to gain valuable civic skills (Smith 2002; Smith and Tolbert 
2004).17 Specifically, research finds that in states where there is at least one ballot 
measure present during each election cycle, the average citizen political knowledge levels 
tend to be higher than in states with lower or no initiative use (Smith 2002). Average 
citizen political knowledge also tends to expand modestly through exposure to direct 
legislation over time (Gerber 1999; Smith 2001; 2002; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 
                                                 
17 Higher political knowledge is defined in the literature as the ability to correctly answer factual questions 
about American government and current political issues. Commonly, the notion has been operationalized 
by the American National Election Studies (ANES). 
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2003). Such findings are textbook arguments for the way in which citizen legislating is 
perfect consistent with democratic norms. This indicates that in addition to the obvious 
shaping of the policy landscape, citizen legislating appears to play a role in encouraging 
democratic participation (Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003).  
An equally important finding related to direct legislation is the influence it holds 
over the number of citizen groups in a state (Boehmke 2002; 2005). Figure 2 outlines the 
percent increase in the number of interest groups due to the adoption of the initiative 
process in the states. The interest group population that is most readily transformed by 
the presence of direct legislation is the state’s citizen group population (Boehmke 2005). 
Specifically, states in which the initiative option is available have, on average, 45% more 
citizen groups than non-initiative states (Boehmke 2005, 148). 
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               Figure 2: Percent Increase in Interest Groups Due to the Initiative Process: 27 States 
  Source: Frederick Boehmke (2005, 70) 
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Notably, as the number of citizen groups rise as a percentage of a state’s total 
interest group population, a state may be said to have a more diverse interest group 
system (Boehmke 2005). Interest group diversity has been operationalized as the percent 
of active lobbying associations within a state that can be classified as citizen groups 
(Gray and Lowery 1996; Boehmke 2005). In each of the 50 states, economic groups have 
always outnumbered citizen groups (Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996). In states with the 
highest numbers of citizen groups, historically (California, New York, and Illinois), the 
percent of total interest groups that are citizen associations has never been higher than 
45%.18 Given the baseline disparity of economic to citizen associations, the presence of 
direct legislation may assist in balancing a state’s mix of interest groups.  
Interestingly, the initiative process itself does not lend itself to higher overall state 
interest group populations (Boehmke 2002). This occurs because the initiative process 
does not increase the number of active economic groups within a state. Rather, the 
influence of the process appears to be focused entirely upon citizen groups.  In particular, 
the number of citizen groups can and does fluctuate in response to the count of ballot 
measures in a state (Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Boehmke 2002; 2005).  
Fortunately, these expectations lend support to treating a state’s annual ballot 
measure count as an explanatory variable in attempts to explain citizen group populations 
and to counter potential endogeneity issues. Someone might suggest that more interest 
groups equals more citizen initatives, but Frederick Boehmke (2005) establishes that the 
primary direction of causality is from direct democracy as an institution to more citizen 
groups. The initiative process itself engenders greater citizen group density within a state 
                                                 
18 The state in which 45% of its interest group population is made up of citizen groups is California. 
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(Boehmke 2002). Moreover, the associated growth in economic groups is dwarfed by the 
expansion of citizen associations (see Figure 2).  
A state’s ballot measure count may influence its citizen group population through 
the spurring of democratic competition (Gerber 1999; Braunstein 2004; Boehmke 2005, 
142). Countermeasures are employed as a reaction to original ballot items. Thus, it would 
appear that the existence of certain measures engender additional citizen group formation 
in order to advocate and sponsor opposing pieces of direct legislation. The very act of 
citizen legislating appears to expand the scope of conflict and broaden the interested 
public (Boehmke 2005).  
It is noteworthy that the initiative process originated and was employed in select 
states nearly a century before the proliferation of citizen groups in the 1970’s. 
Specifically, the more rural Western states were among the first to adopt and employ the 
process. Thus, at least initially, a state’s ballot measure count was largely unrelated to the 
number and diversity of interest group populations (Initiative and Referendum Institute 
2007).  The ballot measures themselves appear to be a product of populism and citizen 
efficacy rather than interest group density in the states (Gerber 1999).  
In addition to discernable influences on the citizenry, direct legislation also 
appears to exert pressure on state government. Research on governmental responsiveness 
finds the mere threat of an initiative effects state legislative behavior (Garrett 1999; 
Gerber 1999; Gerber 2001; Alexander 2002). The legislative agenda will often shift to 
accommodate the potential ballot measure.  A comparable piece of related legislation will 
be taken up by the state legislature while the initiative or referendum is circulating 
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through the signature acquisition phase.19 Consequently, higher ballot measure counts 
appear to be associated with noticeable changes in legislative agendas. Advocates argue 
that this agenda shift is evidence of greater governmental responsiveness to the public, a 
healthy by-product of direct democracy in the form of citizen legislating.  
Moreover, there is evidence that both economic and citizen interest groups may 
employ this threat of initiative or referendum to gain the government’s attention for their 
cause (Gerber 1996b; Nicholson 2005). The threat alone increases issue salience and it is 
precisely because of this “gun behind the door” that ballot measure counts are employed 
as a key explanatory variable in much research, rather than the number of ballot measures 
passed (Lascher, Hagan, and Rochlin 1996, 760). Direct legislation appears to exert 
influence on the state of governance regardless of whether its associated policies make it 
into law. 
Notably however, there is little consensus on whether the initiative process is 
associated with greater public opinion-government policy congruence (Lascher, Hagen, 
and Rochlin 1996; Matsusaka 2004). For instance, in California, the government’s action 
in the revision of the state’s tax policy during the 1990s and industry regulation is not 
mirrored by public support for the policies (Donovan and Bowler 1998b). Such opinion-
policy incongruence persists despite California having one of the strongest traditions of 
direct legislation (Camobreco 1998; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). In the end, 
while findings suggest that ballot measures induce a “responsive shift” in government 
                                                 
19 Is has also been noted that lobbying groups may employ the threat of an initiative (outside strategy) to 
acquire more inside access to state legislators (Boehmke 2005, 138-40, 142). 
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policy, it is not entirely clear if this shift moves policy into greater alignment with public 
opinion (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001).20  
Indeed, critics of direct democracy charge that citizen legislation does not solidify the 
public opinion-public policy connection (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Camobreco 
1998, 828).  However, some of these same researchers argue ballot measures may serve 
as valid “points in time” gauges of public sentiment on a specific policy (Lascher, Hagen, 
and Rochlin 1996, 772). While direct legislation does not necessarily engender opinion-
policy congruence, it may be a useful tool to observe cross-sections of the political and 
policy climate over many years.  
It should be noted that state policy is a dynamic creature. Policies shed and 
accumulate popular support over time and through public deliberation. Public policy is 
contextually dependent (Sharp 1999). Consequently, exploring the influences of citizen 
legislating upon the state of governance may require a dependent variable that is less 
situation-specific than “popular support” (or lack thereof) for a particular public policy at 
a single point in time. Consequently, this study advocates a methodological revision to 
the existing opinion-policy congruence model. Specifically, ideology is proposed as a 
more appropriate dependent variable when modeling the governance process. Ideology 
does not limit itself to specific public policies or context; ideological dispositions tend to 
be stable and coherent across time (Converse 1964, 206-8). Ideology, on the traditional 
left-right continuum, allows for greater validity and continuity in exploring the potential 
                                                 
20 This issue is termed by John G. Matsusaka (2004) as the question “of the many or the few.” (3). 
Matsusaka finds evidence that passing ballot items are generally in congruence with majority public 
opinion. Moreover, scholars note that there appears to be sizable opinion-policy congruence on proposed 
initiatives that are symbolic in content. Such measures tend to have few substantive or technical 
implications (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; Gerber 1999; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001). 
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associations between citizen legislating and governmental responsiveness, a substantive 
facet of good governance.21  
Regarding government policy outputs, there is strong evidence that extensive use 
of the initiative process is associated with a reduction in the size and centralization of 
state government, as well as less financial redistribution of state wealth (Matsusaka 1995, 
2004). And, it should come as no surprise that extensive use of direct legislation 
purportedly complicates state budgeting processes and taxation methods (Donovan and 
Bowler 1998b).  
While ballot measures interact with representative democracy in ways that might 
“partially remedy one [governmental] defect” such as a lack of “responsiveness,” it may 
exacerbate rival problems in the state government such as budget balancing (Donovan 
and Bowler 1998b, 271). States that frequently employ the initiative, for instance, are less 
likely to employ progressive taxation (in which the wealthiest citizens pay greater 
proportions of their annual income in state taxes than do those who are less well-to-do).22 
Consequently, the more disadvantaged citizens pay a disproportionate share of the 
funding for public services in less progressive tax systems, which occur 
disproportionately in states with high use of citizen initiatives (Matsusaka 1995; Lascher, 
Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Donovan and Bowler 1998b, 259). Thus, it seems that passing 
or even proposing ballot measures may serve as effective mandates to state government 
                                                 
21 Specifically, this research uses the ideology of a state citizenry and the ideology of a state government to 
calculate the dependent variable “ideological distance” that will serve as a measure of elite/mass policy 
congruence (see Berry et al. 1998). The ideological distance calculation will be detailed in the research 
design section. 
22 “High-use” states are outlined by the Initiative and Referendum Institute (2007). Notably, states with the 
initiative are also associated with a decentralization of spending (Matsusaka 2004, 3). That is, state 
governments in initiative states appear to pass the buck to local governments significantly more than 
noninitiative states (Matsusaka 1995; 2004; 2008). However, this phenomenon has yet to be systematically 
tied to the actual usage of the initiative process. 
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regarding desired public policy. As a result, balanced budgets may be displaced in favor 
of financing costly ballot measure policies. Donovan and Bowler (1998b) note that: 
Contrary to what Progressive advocates might have expected, [the initiative 
process] does not necessarily cause more “responsible” budgeting in the long 
run… By frequently presenting voters with only part of the fiscal equation 
(cutting taxes, maybe borrowing, but rarely spending choices or raising new 
revenue), direct democracy places the state legislature in a position where it might 
be extremely difficult for them to write a budget (264). 
 
Paradoxically however, there is also evidence to suggest that greater initiative usage is 
associated with lower government spending at the state level across the board (Matsusaka 
1995). While the initiative process, both directly (through passage) and indirectly 
(through “threat”), is related to costly public policy implementation that may impede 
financial responsibility, direct legislation is also associated with the imposition of debt 
limitation provisions and spending caps which may aid state fiscal health (Matsusaka 
1995; 2008; Gerber 1998; 1999; Initiative and Referendum Institute 2007).23  
This study will attempt to discern the underlying influences of direct legislation 
upon state fiscal health and financial responsibility; one possible substantive indicator of 
good governance. Here, the study diverges from extant research by operationalizing fiscal 
health by year-end reserves instead of general state revenues and expenditures. Year-end 
reserves are calculated by taking the total monetary amount remaining in a state’s coffers 
at the end of each fiscal year, including rainy day funds, and then dividing by the state’s 
total expenditures. Ultimately, this renders a state’s year-end reserves as a percentage of 
its total expenditures to control for the significant unit effects between states in budget 
size as well as the occurrence of random natural disasters across the regions. It will be 
                                                 
23 Studies indicate that initiative use within states is related to less redistribution of state wealth (Matsusaka 
1995, 620). 
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argued that larger year-end reserves are positive indicators of substantive good 
governance. 
Still other research on direct legislation focuses on how it shapes specific public 
policies (Bone and Benedict 1975; Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Matsusaka 2008). For 
instance, when the initiative process is available within a state, there is a greater 
likelihood that the state will adopt English-only laws, Indian gaming amendments, 
legislative term limits, capital punishment, and gay marriage bans (Tatalovich 1995; Cain 
and Miller 2001; Schildkraut 2001; Boehmke 2005; Boehmke et al. 2006).24 Nearly all of 
these policies in the American states have their origins in citizen legislation, and each is 
frequently seen as controversial. Such initiative-policy connections invoke the recurrent 
question of how desirable citizen legislating truly, especially when one considers the 
process is associated with socially and politically intolerant public policy views (Wenzel, 
Donovan, and Bowler 1998; Yi 2008). Indeed, legislating through initiative does appear 
to have produced measures that adversely affect minority groups such as limited-English 
proficiency residents as well as the gay and lesbian populations within states (Magelby 
1984; Tatalovich 1995; Tolbert and Hero 1998; Schildkraut 2001).  
Critics have linked political intolerance (Tatalovich 1995; Schildkraut 2001) and 
fiscal irresponsibility (Donovan and Bowler 1998b) to the presence of the initiative 
process in states.  Implicit within these studies is the question of how desirable citizen 
legislating truly is for overall quality governance.  To date, few efforts have been made to 
tie citizen legislation in any systematic way to the quality of governance as a whole, 
opting instead, to point out specific ways that it has been either effective or ineffective in 
                                                 
24 It is important to note that the likelihood of these policy adoptions is also easily tied to overall state 
citizen ideology (Boehmke 2005).  
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specific circumstances and often in specific states.  This research will attempt to rectify 
the lack of a macro-level approach o the desirability of citizen legislating. 25 
 
Literature Conclusions 
Ultimately, there exists a maddening list of potential implications stemming from 
the initiative and popular referendum literature. However, a single theoretical question 
does run throughout much of the literature: Is citizen legislating ultimately helpful or 
harmful to governance? Contemporary direct democracy was established to combat 
legislative collusion. The initiative was a rallying cry for better governance. To some 
extent, it still is today.26 But is citizen legislating associated with indicators of good 
governance in any systematic way? Extant literature leaves us with conflicting findings 
that lack a holistic approach to test this longstanding query of political science.  
Furthermore, interpreting the existent findings depends upon how the question of 
good governance is framed, in what context the concepts are operationalized, and which 
methodology is employed. For instance, initiatives and referendums are at times framed 
as “good” because they are associated with higher voter turnout and citizen political 
knowledge (Smith 2001; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). However, they may also be 
“bad” as theory suggests that direct legislation may discourage long term fiscal 
responsibility and violate democratic norms (Cupps 1977; Donovan and Bowler 1998b). 
Ballot measures are beneficial because they appear to encourage legislative 
                                                 
25 A notable exception is the work by Russell J. Dalton (2004) who employed state education spending as a 
surrogate measure for good governance.  
26 A state’s annual ballot measure count and the average passage rate of the measures have been employed 
in past research as aggregate level surrogates for public distrust of state government (Matsusaka 1992; 
Braunstein 2004). It has traditionally been held that higher levels of initiative or referendum usage may be 
indicative of low trust in government (Banducci 1998; Ellis 2002; Braunstein 2004).  
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responsiveness (Gerber 1999). However, the measures may also warrant skepticism 
because it is uncertain whether or not it is the true policy preferences of the general 
public (Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996).  
Many studies have established an understanding of the initiative’s operational 
mechanics; when ballot measures appear, when they pass, and what determines the 
passage rates of the measures (Banducci 1998; Gerber 1999; Alexander 2002; Braunstein 
2004). Work has also established how the availability of the initiative process influences 
specific state policies and government spending patterns (Matsusaka 2005) However, a 
preponderance of the explanatory models have been restricted in focus, limiting direct 
legislation to a singular topic or treating it as a stationary institution. Commonly, the 
construct is operationalized by a dummy variable that denotes whether or not the 
initiative process is available in a state (Tatalovich 1995; Wenzel, Donovan, and Bowler 
1998; Zadovny 2000; Boehmke 2005).  
In contrast, this study conceptualizes the initiative and popular referendum as a 
dynamic arm of citizen legislating. It is proposed that its influence over governance 
extends beyond what the traditional binary variable can capture. Simply because the 
process is available within a state does not guarantee usage. States such as Illinois, 
Mississippi, and Wyoming all allow for the citizen initiative. The process, however, is 
almost never employed in these states. Thus, despite the institutional presence of direct 
legislation, a state may be void of any actual citizen legislating.  
This study attempts to frame the interplay of direct democracy with political 
reality in terms of governance; specifically, good governance. Building upon relevant 
literature, the effort is made to move beyond the specifics and to envisage a bigger 
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picture. That is, there is a sense that research has seemingly lost the forest for the trees. 
Consequently, a more holistic vantage point with which to view direct legislation is 
sought.  This study constructs an additive index gauging the degree of “good governance” 
that is present within each state during a given year and compliments this with a measure 
of the actual frequency of the usage of citizen legislating.27 In the end, it is hoped the 
results of this study will firmly establish a first step towards a more comprehensive 
understanding of this elemental and recurring question in political science; the question 
of the citizen legislator. What implications are in store for good governance when the 
public is emboldened through direct democracy?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Additionally, it is intended to provide a test of conclusions drawn within the initiative literature. For 
instance, the link between initiative usage and voter turnout is reexamined (Smith 2001). 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 The empirical component of this research has significant obstacles to maneuver. 
Not the least of which is the creation of a “good governance” index. It will also be 
necessary to operationalize the degree of citizen legislating that is present within each 
state. As noted earlier, this study will use a state’s annual ballot measure count to this 
end. Previous work which has dealt with “good governance” as the dependent variable 
has employed one dimensional surrogate measures such as state education spending 
(Dalton 2004) or voter turnout (Smith 2001). However, the idea of good governance is 
not particular simple and would likely benefit from something more than a one 
dimensional surrogate. This study attempts to achieve a multi-dimensional indicator of 
quality governance. Then, in order to gauge the influence of citizen legislation on good 
governance, the proposed index will be scrutinized by legislative, institutional, 
ideological, and demographic considerations or variables.28  
 
Dependent Variable – Good Governance 
Through the construction of an additive index gauging the effects of a state’s 
ballot measure count upon “good governance,” this research attempts to acquire a more 
holistic understanding of direct democracy. Political theory instructs that contemporary 
conceptions of “good governance” must include both substantive and procedural facets 
(Rousseau [1762] 1988; Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Habermas 1998; Dahl 2005; Rawls 
2005). Consequent to this, the research will expound an index that is multi-dimensional, 
containing four component parts.  
                                                 
28 It should be noted that while the degree of citizen legislating that is present within a state at the aggregate 
level may qualify as an institutional facet, it is handled as a dynamic legislative mechanism for the 
purposes of this study. 
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Two of these factors are intended to capture the substantive side of governance: 
fiscal health as operationalized by annual state year-end reserves and, second, the 
ideological distance between a state’s government and its citizenry. Year-end reserves 
reflect the total budgetary surplus within each state expressed as a percentage of total 
annual expenditures. This allows control for variation in state legislative professionalism, 
economic downturns, and natural disasters which may also impact a state’s fiscal health 
(Eckl 2007; Thatcher 2008). On average, greater year-end reserves are substantive 
indicators of good governance at work. Ideological distance between a state government 
and its citizenry captures the degree of substantive representation, or rather a lack thereof 
that is present in the aggregate. This variable is operationalized by subtracting a state’s 
annual citizen ideology score from its annual government ideology score and taking the 
absolute value of this number (Berry et al. 1998). Originally, state and citizen ideology 
scores range from 0, perfect ideological conservatism, to 1, perfect liberalism.29 Good 
governance is reflected in low ideological distance, indicating that representative 
democracy remains representative (Habermas 1998). 
The remaining two components of governance embody its procedural  
dimension. Procedure references the degree of public inclusiveness that the governing 
system allows. Voter turnout is the first procedural consideration. Total voter turnout is 
calculated for even year elections by taking a state’s voting eligible population and 
dividing by total votes cast for the highest office (McDonald and Popkin 2001). States 
with higher voter turnout signify greater procedural governance. The remaining 
component is state interest group diversity. A diverse interest group population may 
                                                 
29 Data for ideology scores, including the most recent updates, are available on Richard Fording’s 
homepage at: http://www.uky.edu/%7Erford/Home_files/page0002.htm.  
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entail greater public inclusiveness in the representative process (Gray and Lowery 1996; 
Boehmke 2002). Virginia Gray and David Lowery’s data on state interest group 
populations are employed in calculating interest group diversity. Specifically, the variable 
is operationalized as the percentage of a state’s total active interest groups which are 
classified as citizen groups, as opposed to economic groups (Gray and Lowery 1996; 
Gerber 1999). Citizen groups are inherently diverse. For instance, citizen groups may be 
environmental, governance, law and order, social services, or moral values related (Berry 
1993; Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996; Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Braunstein 2004). In 
contrast, economic groups are almost always financial in nature (Walker 1991; Gerber 
1999; Alexander 2002; Braunstein 2004). Furthermore, citizen groups have historically 
comprised a minority of the active lobbying organizations in the states. Even among 
states with diverse lobbying associations, citizen groups have never comprised more than 
45% of any state interest group system.30 Thus, as citizen groups comprise a higher 
percentage of a state’s interest group system, there appears to be a more even split 
between citizen and economic interests within a state (Gray and Lowery 1996; 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Boehmke 2005).  
Good governance should promote a diverse slate of interest representation and 
expand the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960; Habermas 1998). Interest group 
diversity, however, is also indirectly linked to good governance by engendering a more 
involved and informed citizenry (Boehmke 2005), as group membership is associated 
with greater political knowledge and efficacy (Lowery and Gray 1993; Donovan and 
Bowler 1998; Putnam 2000). 
                                                 
30 This state is California. 
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Notably, this study does not use citizen group density as an indicator of good 
governance within the states. Higher citizen group head counts do not necessarily spell 
better governance (Putnam 2000). Citizen associations have at times advocated radical 
ideologies and promoted social or political intolerance (Walker 1991; Putnam 2000; 
Zavodny 2000; Schildkraut 2001). Thus, higher numbers of citizen groups do not entail 
genuine procedural legitimacy. Rather, it is the diversity of a state’s interest group system 
employed as a procedural indicator of governance. 
 Table 1 reports the bivariate correlations between each of the four SGGI 
components. As expected, no significant associations or dependencies between any of the 
four variables emerge. As theory asserts that governance is multi-dimensional, it would 
be problematic if the index parts were highly correlated with one another (Rousseau 1988 
[1762]; Warren 1993; Habermas 1998; Rawls 2005). If high inter-item correlations were 
present, this would indicate that the four components tap only a single dimension. In such 
a case, the empirical model would offer little elucidation as the holistic desirability of 
citizen legislation. 
 
Table 1: Bivariate Correlations, SGGI Components 
 
  
Voter 
Turnout  
Year-end Reserves  
(YER) 
Int. Gr. 
Diversity 
Ideol. 
Distance 
Voter Turnout - 0.08 0.21 -0.10 
YER - - 0.15 -0.01 
Int. Group Diversity - - - -0.15 
Ideol. Distance - - - - 
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Once the four components of the index are assembled, biennial rankings are 
calculated by state. For each year included in the study, the states are ranked separately 
on a scale of 1 to 50 for all four variables.31 Rankings are coded such that as values 
approach 50, the state is said to be marked by good governance. For instance, states with 
greater voter turnout, year-end reserves, and interest group diversity will receive scores 
closer to 50 than those states whose annual turnout is lower by comparison. States with 
lower biennial ideological distance will receive higher rankings than those plagued by 
greater ideological distance between the government and its citizenry.  
Finally, the rankings for each of these four components are combined to form an 
additive index of good governance (SGGI). By design, the index ranges from a minimum 
score of 4, denoting less than optimal governance, to 200, which represents good 
governance. For example, to attain an index score of 4 for a specific year, a state must 
possess the lowest annual voter turnout, year-end reserves, interest group diversity, and 
the greatest ideological distance in comparison to other states. In theory, good 
governance as an ideal type is set and stable. However, in empirical reality, the state of 
governance must be comparative and thus also relative to similar units of analysis. More 
importantly, any multiplicative or additive index arising out of the raw data from the 
components would generate abnormally high governance scores for outlier states such as 
Alaska which traditionally has an abundance of year-end reserves. For this reason, an 
index rooted in rank seems particularly appropriate.  
                                                 
31 States with identical values on one or more of the index components are given the same rank for that 
year. 
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For the time period studied (1980-2000), the mean SGGI score is 103.00. Its 
proximity to the median value (99.80) indicates that data are normally distributed.32 This 
also provides ideal testing circumstances, as normality is a common assumption in 
regression analysis. Figure 3 examines the distribution of the SGGI by transforming each 
value into a z-score. The maximum and minimum governance values that appear in the 
data are 162 and 54, respectively. As evidenced in Figure 3, these values are positioned 
just outside the negative and positive two standard deviation boundaries.  
 
 
              Figure 3: Good Governance Frequency Distribution, 1980-2000 
 
 
                                                 
32 The standard deviation is 32.67. 
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While literature on the initiative and popular referendum processes abounds and is 
indispensably informative, the bulk of focus has been upon individual or microcosmic 
components of government and governance rather than a systematic or holistic approach. 
The methodology employed within this study presumes that the whole is, in fact, greater 
than the sum of its parts.33   
Key Explanatory Variable – Citizen Legislating 
 Citizen legislating is operationalized by the total number of citizen initiatives or 
popular referendums that appeared on a state-wide ballot every two years for each of the 
fifty states. States that opt not to employ direct legislation or do not have either process 
available are coded 0, indicating an absence of citizen legislation.34 
 All else being equal, citizen legislation should be positively associated with 
higher state governance scores. In theory, direct legislation imposes an unavoidable 
accountability upon government (Rousseau 1988 [1762]; Schmidt 1989). This 
responsiveness is thought to be a bedrock tenet of direct democracy. That is, when 
government steps out of line ideologically, it is the job of the citizenry to stand up and 
enforce substantive representation (Schmidt 1989; Smith 2002; Braunstein 2004; 
Matsusaka 2004).  
 For the procedural indicators of governance, the presence of a ballot measure 
offers a modest increase in voter turnout during that electoral cycle (Everson 1981; Smith 
                                                 
33 The four component parts of the index have accumulated substantial bodies of literature. Specifically, 
studies abound in the area of voter turnout (McDonald and Popkin 2001; Smith 2001; Brown, Jackson, and 
Wright 1999; Jackson 1996; Lee and Berry 1982). In an effort to demonstrate the validity of the proposed 
good governance index, four appendix models are constructed. These are auxiliary models that demonstrate 
how relationships uncovered in literature continue to hold in this data. Consequently, each of the four index 
components are measured against their key explanatory variables as reported or theorized in prior work. All 
references to ballot measures have been excluded from consideration. Appendices A through D contain 
these simplified regression analyses. There, brief summaries of the models and results will be reported. 
34 Government sponsored initiatives and referendums are excluded from analysis as these measures are not 
citizen initiated.  
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2001; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). Additionally, citizen legislating also appears to 
alter a state’s interest group landscape (Boehmke 2002; 2005). Both the availability and 
the frequency with which a state employs the initiative influences the state’s citizen 
group population (Walker 1991; Gray and Lowery 1996; Tocqueville 2000 [1835]). For 
instance, when states the public to employ the initiative or popular referendum, citizen 
groups tend to proliferate more than economic groups (Boehmke 2005). Moreover, 
higher ballot measure counts increase the likelihood that additional citizen groups will 
form and sponsor counter-measures (Gerber 1999; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003; 
Braunstein 2004). Consequently, citizen legislating effectively enlarges state interest 
representation by expanding the scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960). 
 Among the substantive indicators of governance, findings have been more 
conflicting. Regarding state fiscal health, some studies assert that direct legislation leads 
to costly and unwise public policy implementation (Clingermayer and Wood 1995; 
Donovan and Bowler 1998b). However, others have found no valid link between citizen-
initiated legislation and financial crises in the states once extant state debt and spending 
patterns are held constant (Matsusaka 1992; 2004; 2008; Thatcher 2008).   
 
Institutional Influences 
 In political science research, findings have demonstrated that institutions matter. 
That is, institutional influences bear, at minimum, comparable explanatory weight as 
contextual or demographical characteristics in units of analysis (Easton 1970). State 
institutional settings almost assuredly have a substantial impact upon the quality of 
governance. For the purpose of model specification, factors such as legislative 
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professionalism, interparty competition, difficulty of voter registration, divided 
government, and state legislative term limits are controlled for.  
 Legislative professionalism is operationalized by the Squire index, in which state 
scores range from 0, indicating legislative “amateurism”, to a score of 1 which indicates a 
“professionalism” equivalent to the U.S. Congress.35 Professionalism is linked to several 
components of the SGGI.  Namely, ideological distance, interest group diversity, and 
year-end reserves bear strong associations with legislative professionalism. For instance, 
there is evidence that progressively ambitious careerists are more likely to be 
concentrated in professional legislatures than in states with more amateur legislative 
bodies (Squire 1993; Maestas 2000, 664; Squire and Hamm 2005). The result is a 
clustering of constituent-conscious legislators in states with more professionalized 
chambers (Chaffey 1970; Hofstetter 1971; Hibbing 1986; Berkman 1993; Mooney 1995; 
Berry 2000; Maestas 2000). This may minimize ideological distance between the 
government and the citizenry. While less ideological distance is a decidedly positive asset 
to governance, legislative professionalism has also been associated with fewer year-end 
reserves as a function of rampant government spending and less interest group diversity 
(Banducci 1998; Berkman 2001).36 
                                                 
35 For the 1980 entries, the 1979 Squire index scores are employed. From 1982 through 1984, 1986 and 
1979 professionalism scores are averaged. For 1986 and 1989, 1986 Squire index calculations are used. For 
1990 and 1992, the states’ 1989 and 1996 index values are averaged. For 1994 and 1996, the 1996 Squire 
index scores are employed. And finally, 1998 and 2000 entries are calculated by average the states’ 1996 
and 2003 scores. This depicts the steady changes in legislative professionalism over time. 
36 Again, it would be a mistake to operationalize the diversity of state interest groups by employing a strict 
head count of active groups. This would likely be confounded with legislative professionalism itself. 
Professionalized states also tend to have less homogenous populations and thus more heterogeneous 
interests in play; such states simply have more resources available for consumption (Squire 1992; Gray and 
Lowery 1996; Berkman 2001). Thus, while professionalized states will almost assuredly have more interest 
groups in raw numbers, there may be great disparity between economic and citizen groups. 
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 Interparty competition is also a relevant consideration in the study of quality 
governance (see Hill and Leighley 1993). Notably, interparty competition has been tied to 
less ideological distance and greater voter turnout in the states (see Downs 1957 and 
Jackson 1996, respectively). Intuitively then, interparty competition should wield a 
positive influence on quality governance (Barrilleaux 1986; Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and 
Langer 2002). Most indices of party competition, however, are measurements of 
competition over time. Consequently, they are available only on a per-decade basis (see 
Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993).37 Because of this limitation, a more rudimentary measure 
that enables annual variation in party competition values is employed. The percentage of 
a state House that is Democrat is subtracted from the percent that is Republican.38 Next, 
the absolute value of this number is taken, rendering a scale ranging from 0 to 100. 
Finally, the scale is inverted so that higher numbers represent more even splits between 
the two parties at the state legislative level.  
 Additional institutional controls include the difficulty of voter registration, 
divided government, and state legislative term limits. Key to the explanation of voter 
turnout is the difficulty of voter registration (Jackson 1996). Difficulty of voter 
registration is operationalized by the number of days before an election that voter 
registration closes. It should be negatively related to quality governance, as it hinders 
public participation and inclusiveness in the political process.  
Also, government is said to behave differently when it is divided (Bowman and 
Kearney 2002); that is, when a single political party controls, at most, two of the three 
                                                 
37 One of the most popular measures of interparty competition is the time-honored Ranney index. 
38 Due to the extreme dearth of independents and third party members in state legislatures, these numbers 
are excluded from calculations. Nebraska is the only state with a unicameral legislature that is chosen 
through nonpartisan elections. To compensate for this, the state’s congressional House delegation is used to 
calculate interparty competition. 
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elected bodies of state government including the governorship, the state House and state 
Senate.39 Prior work has argued that when divided government is present, there is greater 
accountability and attentiveness to the public on account of uncertain political futures for 
the parties in government (Fiorina 1989; 1994; Bowman and Kearney 2002). For each 
case, a state is scored 1 if divided government is present and 0 otherwise (if a single 
political party controls the governorship, the state House, and state Senate).  
A dummy variable is also created to control for the presence of state legislative 
term limits. States in which term limits are present are coded 1 and 0 if no such measures 
are in place. There are conflicting expectations for state legislative term limits. On one 
hand, they are thought to enhance accountability and to ensure new individuals and ideas 
are moving into the chambers (Squire and Hamm 2005, 63-4). However, there is also the 
potential for legislative dependency upon interest groups and lobbying forces for 
information and clarification as new legislators learn the ropes (Bowman and Kearney 
2002). Potentially, these institutional settings offer telling specifications. 
 
Ideological Considerations 
 In addition to suspected institutional influences upon the state of governance, 
ideological considerations are made as well. Specifically, the degree of ideological 
extremism within a state’s citizenry and government liberalism are controlled for in the 
comprehensive model.  
 Ideological extremism is generally equated with ideological coherence (Converse 
1964). Moreover, a citizenry that is imbued with a strong sense of ideology is also, on 
                                                 
39 Once more, Nebraska’s unicameral and nonpartisan legislature poses a methodological issue. The state’s 
divided government score is calculated by employing their House and Senate congressional delegation as 
proxies for the state legislature. 
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average, a more active and efficacious one as well (Weissberg 1975; Hanson 1980; 
Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988). Both citizen activity and efficacy are textbook ingredients for 
quality governance (Rousseau 1988 [1762]; Habermas 1998; Rawls 2005). Thus, it is 
anticipated the states with more ideologically extreme citizenries will be positively 
associated with better quality governance. Citizen ideological extremism is measured by 
transforming a state’s value on the Citizen Ideology index (see Berry et al. 1998) into a z-
score and taking the absolute value of the number. This renders a scale which captures 
extremism, regardless of direction on the left-right continuum. Government liberalism 
appears to influence the general health of state finances and year-end reserves in 
particular (Squire 1992; 1993; Bowman and Kearney 2002, Ch. 6; Eckl 2007). Simply 
and perhaps predictably, when state government is more liberal, the state tends to possess 
fewer year-end reserves (Squire 1992; Bowman and Kearney 2002, Ch. 6).40 Government 
liberalism is operationalized by the Government Ideology index in which state scores 
range from 0 to 1 in which higher scores denote greater government liberalism (Berry et 
al. 1998).  
 
Demographic Controls 
 Relevant demographic controls are also be implemented.  These five variables 
include the education of the electorate, whether a state may be classified as having a 
“traditionalistic” political culture, gross state product-squared, state debt per capita, and 
the state unemployment rate.  
                                                 
40 Intuitively, liberal governments tend to spend more across the board and specifically devote more 
resources to social welfare programs (Squire 1992; King 2000; Bowman and Kearney 2002, Ch. 6). 
 39
An educated electorate should demand better governance, and more importantly, 
recognize good public policy (Schmidt 1989; Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003). Thus, a 
positive relationship between education and a state’s SGGI score is expected. The 
education of the electorate is operationalized by the percent of a state’s population that 
has a four year degree or higher. Education explains a disproportionate amount of 
variance in voter turnout models (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 2003).  
 Equally important as education is the notion of a state’s political culture. Culture 
has traditionally been measured by a dummy variable denoting whether or not a state can 
be classified as southern. A more viable alternative to the popular south dummy is the 
variable of traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1966; Patterson 1968; Johnson 1976; 
Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988; Layman and Carmines 1997). Rooted in both current and 
historical trends in religious attendance, the traditionalistic culture variable is arguably a 
more direct measurement of state culture than simply its geographical placement. 
Traditionalistic political cultures are less politically inclusive, less efficacious, and have 
less politically knowledgeable electorates (Johnson 1976; Fitzpatrick and Hero 1988; 
Layman and Carmines 1997). All else being equal, states with traditionalistic political 
cultures are simply less likely to exhibit signs of quality governance and must be 
controlled for. Traditionalistic states are coded 1, and all others are denoted 0. 
 Gross state product (GSP) is an integral control for the state interest group 
diversity component of good governance. GSP alone comprises one third of the ESA-
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model of interest group density (see Gray and Lowery 1996).41 This variable represents 
the energy or resources of a state that are available for consumption. Consequently, states 
with higher GSP are likely to have more active interest groups across the board (Gray and 
Lowery 1994). However, GSP is inherently heteroscedastistic across the 50 states. 
Consequently, it is a state’s GSP-squared that is included in the model and renders the 
correct functional form (Gray and Lowery 1996).  
 The final two demographic variables under consideration are a state’s debt per 
capita and the state unemployment rate. With its strong negative relationship to year-end 
reserves, debt per capita (in millions) should be negatively related to a state’s SGGI 
score.42 Since debt may influence the capacity of a state to provide quality governance, it 
is a necessarily demographic control. The percent of a state’s workforce facing 
unemployment may also impede quality governance. When the public is confronted with 
dismal economic conditions, it may be less likely join citizen groups or may simply 
demand policies that focus upon economic recovery at the expense of post-material 
issues.   
 Table 2 showcases the good governance model. By controlling for relevant 
institutional, ideological, and demographic factors, this study aims to disentangle the 
influences of citizen legislating by examining good governance from a more holistic 
perspective.  
 
 
                                                 
41 The ESA-model asserts that state interest group populations are largely a function of a state’s energy 
(resources available for consumption), stability (stability of party control in government), and area. See 
Gray and Lowery (1994; 1996) for a detailed discussion of the ESA-model. 
42 There is much variation between the states in debt loads. This variation is readily observable on an 
annual basis. See any volume of the Book of the States for reports on state debt per capita. 
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 Table 2: Good Governance Holistic Model Summary 
  
Variables (exp. sign)                                          Coding 
 
Key Explanatory 
   
Citizen Legislating (+)                                        No. biennial ballot measures in a             
                                                                            state                
Institutional  Influences 
  Legislative Professionalism (-)                          Squire index of legislative   
                                                                             professionalism (0 - 1)                           
  Interparty Competition (+)                                 Abs (% House Dem - % House Rep)      
   
  Difficulty of Voter registration (-)                     No. days before election voter   
                                                                              registration closes                              
  Divided Government (+)                                    Coded 1 if divided gov’t is present    
                                                                              in a state; coded 0 if unified gov’t          
  State Legislative Term Limits (-)                       Coded 1 if state leg. term limits are 
                                                                              present in a given year; 0 if absent         
Ideological Considerations 
  Government Liberalism (-)                                 State Gov’t Ideology Index (0-100);  
                                                                               higher scores denote greater liberal.      
  Citizen Ideological Extremism (+)                      Z-score of State Citizen Ideology    
                                                                               Index (0-100); higher z-scores denote  
                                                                               greater extremism                           
Demographic Controls 
  % College Grads in State (+)                               % state pop. that has a four year   
                                                                               degree or higher                                     
  Traditional Political Culture (-)                           Coded 1 for states with trad. political  
                                                                               culture; and 0 if non-trad.                      
  Gross State Product-squared (+)                          GSP-squared by state and year in   
                                                                                millions              
  State Debt Per Capita (-)                                      Dept per capita by state and year in   
                                                                                millions                          
  Unemployment (-)                                                % of state pop. that is classified by     
                                                                                US Census Bureau as unemployed   
                                                                                by year                             
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Method 
 Table 2 outlines the comprehensive regression model as well as the expected 
relationship between the variables and quality governance. The study employs a pooled 
cross-sectional design spanning 20 years (1980-2000).  As is common in pooled models, 
significant unit and time effects are present between the states. To correct for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation that is innate to the research design, the model is 
run using a random-effects generalized-least squares regression (GLS). GLS is, in effect, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with a corrective weight term added which adjusts the 
standard errors of the coefficients (Gujarati 1995, Ch. 11).  
Econometric texts instruct that “in the presence of autocorrelation or 
heteroscedasticity, GLS is preferable to OLS and produces unbiased estimators” (Gujarati 
1995, 367). Moreover, a random-effects model assumes that the nature of 
heteroscedasticity varies either by year or by value of the independent variables. That is 
to say, the effects of heteroscedasticity are not fixed. An example of a fixed-effect is 
gross state product, which is inherently heteroscedastistic (see Gray and Lower 1996) but 
is readily corrected by including the squared values of state GSP. A random-effect, on the 
other hand, is not as easily remedied, as the problematic error term changes in degree and 
nature over time. Consequently, a random-effects GLS regression adjusts the standard 
errors to produce a more statistically conservative test (Gujarati 1995, Ch. 11, 12). The 
following model is run: 
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Good Governance = a + b1(Citizen Legislation) – b2(Legislative Professionalism)  
         – b3(Difficulty of Voter Registration) + b4(Divided Government)  
         – b5(Legislative Term Limits) – b6(Government Liberalism)  
         + b7(Citizen Ideological Extremism) + b8(% College Grads in State)  
                                 -- b9(Traditionalistic Political Culture) + b10(GSP2)  
                    – b11(State Debt Per Capita) – b12(State Unemployment) + et 
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IV. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
A majority of extant research has held citizen legislation against one dependent 
variable, such as state fiscal health, at a time. Consequently, a myriad of conflicting 
conclusions have been drawn given citizen legislating a mixed reputation. When 
econometric models are limited to single or one-dimensional measures of governance, 
general theoretical conclusions on contemporary direct democracy are hard to come by. 
The key objective of this study is to model direct legislation against a holistic measure of 
governance and to allow for more general conclusions regarding its desirability. 
 
Key Explanatory Variable – Citizen Legislating 
Citizen legislation, a state’s ballot measure count, is positively associated with all 
four substantive and procedural indicators of good governance.43 Table 3 examines the 
bivariate correlations for each of the four SGGI components with a state’s biennial ballot 
measure count. The positive relationship with voter turnout holds (Smith 2001; Tolbert et 
al. 2003); as does its negative relationship with ideological distance (Schmidt 1989; 
Gerber 1996; Berry et al. 1998). Furthermore, when fiscal health is conceptualized as 
annual year-end reserves, rather than raw state spending data, direct legislation is 
modestly associated with a reigning-in of state fiscal management (Matsusaka 2004; 
2008).  
 
Table 3: Bivariate Correlations, Citizen Legis. and SGGI Components, 1980-2000 
  Voter Turnout Year-end Res. Ideological Dist. Int. Group Divers. 
Citizen Legis. 0.26 0.26 -.23 0.21 
                                                 
43 It is negatively associated with ideological distance between a state’s government and its citizenry. Thus, 
less ideological distance is equated to better quality governance. 
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Table 3 demonstrates, at best, a modest association between citizen legislating 
and each of the four governance indicators. However, it should not be concluded just yet 
that direct legislation exhibits only a minute effect upon governance.44 When considering 
governance, this study proposes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That is, 
when modeling governance, it must be considered as a single holistic construct. Citizen 
legislation is frequently on trial for influencing “the state of governance”, for better or 
worse (Donovan and Bowler 1998; Smith 2001; Alexander 2002; Tolbert et al. 2003; 
Braunstein 2004; Matsusaka 2004). Yet, it is typically tried against pieces of 
“substantive” governance, state spending for instance, held in isolation from the 
theoretical whole. Moreover, critics rarely give due credit for its embodiment of 
“procedural” inclusiveness.  
Once citizen legislation is held against a comparative and more holistic measure 
of good governance, its influence appears to be anything but modest. The Pearson’s r 
correlation statistic between citizen legislation and the cumulative index is notably 
greater than any of the singular correlations found in Table 3 (r = .46). Findings from 
regression analysis are even stronger. Holding constant key institutional, ideological, and 
demographic control variables, GLS regression output in Table 4 reveals remarkably 
clear and coherent support for citizen legislating. As state ballot measures grow in 
number, the state obtains significantly higher SGGI scores. It is also particularly 
promising that each variable influences governance in the hypothesized direction. Table 4 
contains the comprehensive Good Governance regression output. The coefficients help to 
paint a particularly robust portrait of the citizen legislator. 
                                                 
44 Granted, even if citizen legislating were limited to a “minute effect” on governance, this would still be a 
potentially fatal blow to critics of direct democracy. 
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Table 4: Good Governance Regression, 1980-2000 
            
       Variables                              Expected Sign                           Model 
Key Explanatory 
     Citizen Legislation                                       +                                       1.68** 
                                                                                                                    (.58) 
Institutional  Influences 
     Legislative Professionalism                          -                                   - 30.61* 
                                                                                                                (17.95) 
     Interparty Competition                                 +                                      2.83 
                                                                                                                  (6.89) 
     Difficulty of Voter registration                     -                                      - .17 
                                                                                                                    (.19)  
     Divided Government                                    +                                    22.30*** 
                                                                                                                  (1.93) 
     State Legislative Term Limits                       -                                    - 4.07t 
                                                                                                                  (3.25) 
Ideological Considerations 
     State Government Liberalism                       -                                     - .14** 
                                                                                                                   (.05) 
     Citizen Ideological Extremism                     +                                      3.27t 
                                                                                                                  (2.17) 
Demographic Controls 
     % College Grads in State                             +                                      1.03*** 
                                                                                                                   (.33) 
     Traditional Political Culture                         -                                   - 18.23*** 
                                                                                                                  (5.54) 
    Gross State Product-squared                        +                                      7.43e-11*** 
                                                                                                                  (1.69e-11)   
     State Debt Per Capita                                   -                                       - .004*** 
                                                                                                                    (.001) 
     Unemployment                                             -                                       - .30 
                                                                                                                    (.52) 
 
N                                                                                                             516.00 
Wald Chi2                                                                                                    246.36*** 
R2                                                                                                                  .46 
        Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
         *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test) 
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Table 4 demonstrates that the addition of a single ballot measure to a state’s 
biennial ballot moves that state’s governance score up by nearly two points. Several 
states such as Oregon and California have frequently had as many as 18 ballot measures 
during a single election cycle. This equates to an increase of over 30 points in a state’s 
governance score (a scale that maxes out at a total possible value of 200). From a holistic 
vantage point, citizen legislating is a significant mover of governance, both statistically (p 
< .01) and substantively; a potentially momentous finding that is lost when the 
cumulative influence of direct legislation is disregarded in favor of singular or one 
dimensional indicators such as state spending.  
 
Institutional Influences 
Interestingly, Table 4 shows state legislative professionalism as bearing a strong 
negative relationship with state SGGI scores (p < .05).45 It should be reiterated that the 
Squire index ranges from 0 to 1 with decimals in between representing incremental shifts 
in professionalism. The variable’s coefficient of -30.61 shows the movement along the 
good governance scale when a state goes from being perfectly amateur (Squire index 
score = 0) to perfectly professional (Squire index score = 1).  
While it would certainly be unsubstantiated to call this significant coefficient for 
legislative professionalism an empirical test of Plato’s theory of the philosopher king, it is 
nonetheless noteworthy that professionalism is negatively associated with state 
governance scores. Indeed, John Locke warns in his Second Treatise of Government that 
there is much danger in a legislative body that differentiates itself from its environment 
                                                 
45 Professionalism, moreover, positively correlates on average around r = .4 with a state’s biennial ballot 
measure count (Banducci 1998). Given the potential for collinearity, that these variables both maintain their 
significance and hypothesized signs is a testament to their robustness. 
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(2005 [1690], 78-9). This tendency, Locke argues, increases in direct proportion to the 
length of time that a legislative body is “in one lasting assembly” (2005 [1690], 79). 
While unable to foresee the politics of electoral campaigns and continuous reelection 
efforts, Locke did forewarn that longer lasting legislative assemblies may come to see the 
interests of the legislator as distinct from the interests of the citizen. Consequently, it may 
produce policy that is not in accordance with the common good (79). 
While positively associated with good governance as expected (r = .22), interparty 
competition fails to achieve statistical significance in the comprehensive model.46 This is 
not innately problematic. The influence of interparty competition on governance is 
concerned with electoral repercussions of a nonresponsive government and with what 
that means for party control. Fortunately, much of the theoretical importance of interparty 
competition is also contained within the variable of divided government.  
Ever controversial, divided government offers an interesting perspective on 
governance. Scholars have argued both sides of the aisle. Some assert that divided 
government begets gridlock, budget deficits, and minimal legislative productivity (Cox 
and Kernell 1991; McCubbins 1991). However, there is also evidence for the flipside. 
David Mayhew (1991) and Keith Krehbiel (1998) find little cause for alarm, arguing that 
divided government itself is not to blame for gridlock (as supermajorities are frequently 
needed to pass substantive legislation anyway) (see also Dodd and Schraufnagel 2008). 
Rather, divided government may result in more moderate public policies that are in closer 
alignment with the ideology of the public at large (Mayhew 1991; Fiorina 1996; Krehbiel 
1998). The findings presented in Table 4 add tentative evidence to this debate. When 
                                                 
46 The difficulty of voter registration, a key explanatory variable of voter turnout, is also rendered 
insignificant when the comprehensive model is taken into account. However, the variable retains its 
expected negative association with good governance and correlates modestly (r = -.29). 
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cumulatively measured against turnout, fiscal health, interest group diversity, and 
ideological distance, divided government is associated with significant gains in the 
quality of governance. On average, states with divided government rate 22 points higher 
than those with unified government on the SGGI (p < .001). While the focal point of this 
research is citizen legislation, the divided government consideration adds additional color 
to the picture of good governance.  
 Perhaps an equally contentious variable, state legislative term limits is a 
marginally significant institutional influence on governance (p < .10). Scholars debate 
whether or not legislative terms limits induce greater government accountability or 
substantive representation (Bowman and Kearney 2002; Schraufnagel and Halperin 
2006). There is evidence that term limits may actually increase the ideological distance 
between a state government and its citizenry, as incoming freshmen legislators may 
become more reliant upon interest groups for information and socialization to the 
legislative process (Moncrief and Thompson 2001). Moreover, there is evidence to 
suggest that the presence of state legislative term limits may serve as a modest depressant 
on aggregate state voter turnout (Nalder 2007). In Table 4, term limits is associated with 
a 4.07 point drop in a state’s SGGI score, lending some credence to research that has 
cautioned against term limits as a quick and easy fix for government accountability 
(Moncrief and Thompson 2001; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006; Nalder 2007).  
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Ideological Considerations 
Both ideological variables in Table 4 turn up significant relationships to 
governance. State government liberalism is strongly associated with lower SGGI values 
(p < .01). Simply, liberal governments spend more (Squire 1992; 1993; Bowman and 
Kearney 2002; Eckl 2007; Thatcher 2008). This bodes ill for both the year-end reserves 
and ideological distance components of the SGGI. Moreover, greater spending may also 
translate into larger state agencies and bureaucratic networks marked by incrementalism. 
Elaine Sharp (1999, Chs. 3 & 8) warns that policies typified by liberal (as opposed to 
moderate or conservative) governments are at increased risk for following a Downsian 
sequence.47 Government liberalism scores range from 0 to 100 (see Berry et al. 1998). 
The highest liberalism score that appears in the dataset is 97 and the smallest is 0. 
According to this model, movement from the most conservative (0) to most liberal 
government score (97) results in a near 14 drop in a state’s SGGI value.  
Citizen ideological extremism, on the other hand, is positively associated with 
higher quality governance with a marginally significant coefficient of 3.27 (p < .10). On 
average, an electorate that is strong in its ideology is also strong in efficacy (Hanson 
1980; Iyengar 1980; Hill and Leighley 1993). That is to say, an ideological public tends 
to possess the resources needed to be an involved public (Almond and Verba 1989; 
Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Efficacious 
electorates may impose greater accountability on the governing process within a state 
                                                 
47 These policies include affirmative action and welfare programs run by state agencies (Sharp 1999). The 
Downsian sequence is also termed “path dependence” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sharp 1999). The 
sequence refers to the process by which a public policy becomes incrementally ingrained in a state’s 
administrative landscape that eventually its scope moves out of alignment with public support and 
ideology. More importantly, the sequence is not self-correcting. That is, once policy steps outside the zone 
of acquiescence, the public is still unable to bring policy back in line (Sharp 1999). 
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(Hanson 1980). Indeed, there is modest support for this proposition in Table 4. The 
citizen ideological extremism variable is merely the absolute value of a standardized z-
score measure for each state’s Citizen Ideology score (see Berry et al. 1998) that ranges 
from 0 to 3. The idea is that the conservatism or liberalism of a state population does not 
matter to the extent that the degree of the ideology does. As a public becomes more 
ideological (as its value moves from 0 to 3), the SGGI score for the state increases by 
nearly 10 points. 
 
Demographic Controls 
Finally, the results from the four contextual control variables are examined. The 
first variable captures how educated a state electorate is. It is the percent of a state 
population that has achieved a four year degree or greater. As expected, education is a 
highly significant control variable (p < .001). As a state moves from the lowest value that 
appears in the data (2.2%) to the greatest (34.6%), the state’s SGGI value climbs nearly 
34 points, indicating the necessity of controlling for educational disparities among the 
states in studies of governance.  
 The influence of aggregate state political culture is also telling. Specifically, the 
presence of a traditionalistic culture is associated with an 18.23 drop in a state’s SGGI 
value (p < .001). Citizenries within traditionalistic cultures, on average, pay less attention 
to government, turnout to vote less often, and are not as efficacious as are their non-
traditionalistic counterparts (Patterson 1968; Sharkansky 1969; Weissberg 1975; Almond 
and Verba 1989). Traditionalistic culture correlates with state education levels (r = .38). 
The significance levels of these two variables are a testament to their robustness. 
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 The final three variables control for disparate economic conditions between the 
states. Historic financial conditions exert comparable pressure on the state of governance 
as do the more dynamic institutional settings such as citizen legislation or legislative 
professionalism. It is particularly important that a state’s GSP-squared be held constant 
(Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996).48 The GSP2 values for each state are measured in the 
hundred-billions. Thus, the 7.69e-11 coefficient in Table 4 is substantively miniscule (p < 
.001). However, omitting GSP from the model would induce bias into the model given its 
strong ties to both interest group diversity and state fiscal health. Related, a state’s debt 
per capita is a significant influence (p < .001) on year-end reserves component of the 
SGGI (Eckl 2007; Thatcher 2008). Logically, it appears that state’s with greater debt 
loads are forced into lower brackets of quality governance by having fewer resources 
available for consumption and policy implementation (Gray and Lowery 1996).49 Lastly, 
aggregate state unemployment is held constant. Unemployment has appeared in both the 
voter turnout (Jackson 1996; McDonald and Popkin 2001) and state fiscal health 
literature (Matsusaka 1995; 2004; 2008; Thatcher 2008). While negatively associated 
with a state’s SGGI value, as expected, the variable does not achieve statistical 
significance in the comprehensive model (Table 4).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Gray and Lowery (1994; 1996) instruct that due to the inherently heteroscedastistic nature of gross state 
products, the squared values should be employed to achieve the correct functional form. 
49 It should be noted that a state’s ballot measure count is statistically unrelated to debt per capita despite 
the preponderance of such allegations (Matsusaka 2008).  
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Test for Robustness 
 As a test for robustness, the SGGI is split into its substantive and procedural 
dimensions and regressed against the key explanatory variable of citizen legislating, 
measured by a state’s biennial ballot measure count.  Table 5 contains the output of a 
random-effect GLS-regression with robust standard errors for a state’s biennial ballot 
measure count and substantive good governance. The substantive component of the SGGI 
includes data for year-end reserves and ideological distance between the government and 
the citizenry. This smaller index ranges from 2 to 100, where higher values are optimal 
for substantive governance. In Table 5, citizen legislation remains a significant 
explanatory variable in both simplified regression models. The maximum value for a 
biennial ballot measure count that appears in the dataset is 18. As a state moves from 
having no initiatives or popular referendums to having the maximum number of measures 
(18) on the ballot, the substantive component of the SGGI increases by nearly 15 points.  
 
Table 5: Substantive Good Governance Bivariate Regression, 1980-2000 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient 
Citizen Legislation + 
     .81** 
(0.43) 
     
N                  550 
Wald Chi2  994.22*** 
R2                    0.02 
Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test) 
 
Table 6 contains the results of a similar bivariate regression performed on the 
procedural component of the SGGI. As expected, ballot measures remain strongly related 
to the procedural dimension of governance, which includes interest group diversity and 
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voter turnout.50 In fact, the degree of citizen legislation that is present within a state 
explains just over 7% of the variation in the dependent variable. Within the procedural 
dimension (also ranging from 2 to 100), as a state moves from having no direct 
legislation to having 18 measures biennially, its procedural score increases over 22 
points.  
 
Table 6: Procedural Good Governance Bivariate Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient 
Citizen Legislation + 
    1.24*** 
                (0.32) 
     
N                 516 
Wald Chi2                 15.16*** 
R2                    0.07 
Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test) 
 
When governance is viewed comparatively (across similar units) and as a whole, 
direct legislation appears to be an asset rather than a liability to a democratic system. 
Moreover, this relationship holds even when the SGGI is split into its two theoretical 
dimensions, substantive and procedural governance. Tables 5 and 6 are offered as a 
validity check for the comprehensive regression model (see Table 4). That is, what holds 
in the SGGI model of Table 4 also holds when the model is broken down into its 
component parts. Each of the regression analyses contribute to the overall robustness of 
the key explanatory variable, citizen legislation. Of all the variables in Table 4, a state’s 
                                                 
50 It should be noted that the different N for Table 6 is the result of missing state-level data for interest 
group systems. Gray and Lowery (1996) note this in The Population Ecology of Interest Representation but 
assert that it does not skew the findings drawn from the data (255-8). 
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ballot measure count bears one of the strongest relationships to governance, both 
statistically and substantively in terms of the magnitude of the variable’s coefficient.  
 
Citizen Legislating and Good Governance 
Table 7 exhibits the state SGGI scores for each decade of analysis. States are 
ranked in accordance with their 1980-2000 average values. Over 20 years, Alaska, 
Wyoming, and Oregon achieved the highest mean governance values. Alaska and 
Wyoming frequently rank in the top five annually for having the most year-end reserves 
and highest interest group diversity. Coupled with the relative homogeneity of the two 
states, diverse interest group systems engender greater inclusiveness and a more 
expansive scope of conflict (Schattschneider 1960). Oregon places annually among the 
top three states for having the highest voter turnout and lowest ideological distance. 
Among those with the lowest average SGGI scores are South Carolina, Kentucky, and 
Pennsylvania. South Carolina and Kentucky have had remarkably low voter turnout, 
often with fewer than 33% of the electorate turning out during even year elections, and 
high ideological distance between the state government and its citizenries. Pennsylvania 
is plagued by low interest group diversity where the ratio of citizen to economic groups is 
miniscule. Both the Keystone and Buckeye States51 are marked by poor fiscal health 
which manifests through lower year-end reserves. It is noteworthy that the three states 
ranked highest on governance are each active users of the initiative and popular 
referendum. In contrast, the bottommost seven states on Table 7 do not actively employ 
direct legislation.  
                                                 
51 Pennsylvania and South Carolina are commonly called the Keystone State and Buckeye State, 
respectively. 
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These examples help to elucidate the dynamic and multi-dimensional construct of 
governance. For instance, studies that focus solely upon its substantive dimension, fiscal 
health for instance, may conclude that State X has low year-end reserves and thus is 
poorly governed. Alternately, if the focal point is on voter turnout, scholars may see that 
State X has high participation rates and must therefore be governed well. A problem with 
such piecemeal approaches is that the multi-faceted construct of governance is 
erroneously treated as having only a single dimension. The SGGI is offered as a tentative 
first step towards developing a more holistic and theoretically consistent approach in 
assessing the desirability of citizen legislation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57
Table 7: Good Governance Rankings by State 
 State 1980s 1990s 1980-2000 
Good Governance Alaska         149 176 162 
 Wyoming        156 156 156 
 Oregon         143 160 152 
 Montana        154 140 147 
 Minnesota      125 166 146 
 North Dakota   161 117 139 
 Colorado       121 149 135 
 Maine          133 134 134 
 Nebraska       131 136 133 
 Iowa           128 134 131 
 Idaho          136 125 130 
 Kansas         133 126 130 
 New Mexico     126 122 124 
 South Dakota   132 109 120 
 Delaware       126 103 115 
 Rhode Island   - 111 111 
 Nevada         - 109 109 
 Missouri       113 104 109 
 Wisconsin      103 110 107 
 Vermont        114 98 106 
 Massachusetts  108 102 105 
 Connecticut    112 97 104 
 Washington     97 109 103 
Mean Mississippi    96 106 101 
 California     85 116 100 
 Louisiana      110 88 99 
 Alabama        - 96 96 
 Oklahoma       92 99 95 
 Michigan       91 97 94 
 Illinois       103 84 93 
 Indiana        87 93 90 
 Virginia       86 91 89 
 Florida        67 108 88 
 Utah           - 87 87 
 Ohio           86 85 86 
 West Virginia  - 85 85 
 New Jersey     100 62 81 
 Texas          85 76 81 
 North Carolina 84 77 80 
 Arizona        81 78 80 
 Hawaii         - 77 77 
 Georgia        77 77 77 
 Arkansas       92 58 75 
 Tennessee      84 66 75 
 New York       72 78 75 
 Maryland       82 67 75 
 New Hampshire  71 71 71 
 South Carolina 47 85 66 
 Kentucky       69 63 66 
Poor Governance Pennsylvania   - 54 54 
Note: A dash denotes missing data in the citizen group component of the index. Where data are  
missing, scores are not calculated as this would render a misleadingly lower SGGI score overall. 
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Ultimately, what do these results contribute to the theory of governance? Can 
good governance be attained achieved when there is citizen lawmaking? If so, what might 
this theoretical picture resemble? The findings presented in this study offer tentative 
imagery of such a state. Good governance is marked by an efficacious and ideological 
electorate that frequently legislates directly under divided government. Government itself 
is marked by lower levels of institutionalization and less differentiation from its 
environment. Under the banner of representative democracy, governance that strays from 
public accountability cannot be good governance. It burgeons when the public is 
informed, and more importantly, involved. The results presented here unanimously 
indicate that overall, the electorate does seem capable of making beneficial public policy 
decisions. And interestingly enough, one of the most helpful roles government can 
assume appears to be one of restraint. The findings underlie a contemporary story of 
governance as well as strong statistical and theoretical evidence that citizen legislation is 
a desirable facet in democratic society.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 See Appendix E for an alternative holistic model that employs the traditional dummy variable capturing 
whether or not the initiative process is available in the state. These model findings serve as a validity check 
on this study’s primary regression analysis. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 This study offers a new theoretical construct and an empirical test of questions 
surrounding the desirability of citizen lawmaking: Is citizen legislation beneficial to the 
governing process? Does direct legislation serve as a quality input into a governing 
system? Or, as critics charge, are citizen legislators with their limited  knowledge of 
government and public policies more of a liability to good governance? It is a classic 
question of rule with origins that predate political science as an academic discipline. On 
one end of the spectrum are those who argue that lawmakers must be philosopher kings 
or at the very least, knowledgeable elites (Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Burke [1770] 1999). 
On the opposing side sit those who herald that liberty and equality can only occur under  
rule by the people (Rousseau [1762] 1988). Unavoidable in these questions of rule are 
questions of the ‘good.’ Whether it is best achieved through rule by elites or average 
citizens, the endgame for both camps is the slippery and empirically elusive construct of 
good governance.  
Good governance is both substantive and procedural (Rousseau [1762] 1988; 
Plato [360 B.C.E.] 1997; Habermas 1998; Dahl 2005; Rawls 2005). It is a process (see 
Figure 4) that produces beneficial public policies and a healthy state of the union (Easton 
1971), as well as public inclusiveness through a constant expansion of the scope of 
conflict (Schattschneider 1960). As noted earlier, good governance may be more readily 
identifiable by its symptoms than its theoretical essence. Consequently this study 
proposed four indicators of governance, two representing its substantive dimension 
(Rawls 2005) and two from its procedural component (Warren 1993; Habermas 1998). 
Taken together, these four variables comprise empirical indicators of both substantive 
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and procedural governance. Moreover, when the fifty states are ranked biennially on 
voter turnout, year-end reserves, interest group diversity, ideological distance between 
the government and its citizenry, their rankings can be combined together to form a 
multi-dimensional index of good governance. The values of the index allow us to discern 
whether citizen legislating produces a progressive or degenerative association with the 
equilibrium of a political system (Lakatos 1970, 48-52; Easton 1971, 268-74). Figure 4 
below outlines the systems theory approach to governance.  
Inputs 
(Citizen 
Legislation) 
Outputs 
(Public 
Policies) Political System 
Political Environment
Governance
  
               Figure 4: Systems Theory Model of Governance 
 
 As evidenced by Figure 4, good governance is the process by which outputs from 
the political system influence the political environment to produce quality inputs into the 
system. Each cycle moves the process forward towards a continuously improving slate of 
inputs and demands, or at the very least a “non-degenerative equilibrium” (Easton 1971, 
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268-72). The central question at hand, the degree to which citizen legislating is associated 
with good governance, is ultimately an inquiry as to whether citizen rule serves as a 
positive or negative  demand on the political system. The findings of this study  indicate 
that direct democracy is both a significant and beneficial input into the governing 
process. Controlling for factors such as legislative professionalism, divided government, 
state legislative term limits, government liberalism, citizen ideological extremism, state 
education levels, political culture, gross state product, state debt per capita, and state 
unemployment rates, direct legislation has both a significant and positive association with 
indicators of good governance. This finding holds when the operationalization of citizen 
legislation is changed from the preferred ballot measure count to the more traditionally 
employed dummy variable capturing whether the initiative process is available in a state.  
In all, the relationship is robust and holds up throughout all model specifications.53 
 These finding are not suggesting that the public should act as the sole source of 
new legislation in the American states. Rather, these results strongly indicate that among 
the myriad of inputs and demands placed upon a political system, citizen legislation is 
makes a quality contribution to the governing process. Indeed, there is both theoretical 
and empirical evidence to suggest that when citizens operate as legislators, the very act of 
legislating directly is transformative, improving the electorate’s sense of efficacy as well 
as its understanding of both public policy and its own role in government (Lupia 1994; 
Tolbert, McNeal, and Smith 2003; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Matsusaka 2004; Smith 
and Tolbert 2004; 2007). 
                                                 
53 See Appendix E for the results from a random-effects GLS regression that substitutes a dummy variable 
for ballot measure count. The initiative state dummy variable remains significant and positively associated 
with state SGGI scores. However, the relationship is weaker likely due to the muted effect of the dummy 
variable on the substantive component of governance; as institutional presence of the initiative or popular 
referendum does not guarantee use. 
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It is important to note, the contribution of direct democracy to the overall 
governing process may outweigh any single benefit associated with a particular ballot 
measure’s public policy mandate. Most recently, state initiatives banning gay marriage 
during the 2008 general election have been deemed discriminatory and bigoted by 
minority activists (Yi 2008, A1). Critics argue that this is simply the latest installation of 
detrimental public policy to emerge from the initiative process (Yi 2008, A1); that citizen 
legislating cannot possibly be ‘good’ for governance when it produces such adverse 
public policies (Ellis 2002, Chs. 4-5). In this instance, a strictly linear examination of 
Point A (initiatives as input) to Point B (marriage bans as output) may support this 
conclusion. However, it is imperative to consider the influences of citizen legislation on 
the process of governance as a whole.  
Following the passage of a marriage protection amendment in the state of Florida 
(Amendment 2) newly formed gay rights groups registered as active lobbying forces in 
Tallahassee during the succeeding workweek (Associated Press 2008). Amendment 2, 
though arguably a discriminatory policy in and of itself, effectively expanded the scope 
of conflict, spawning the formation of additional citizen groups, which served to further 
diversify the state’s interest group population, thus improving representativeness. 
Citizens began writing letters to their member of Congress, governors, and state 
legislators, protesting the measure, becoming informed, publicly discussing the 
implications of the policy (Associated Press 2008). In short, the measure has people 
talking. Comparable indirect effects have also followed the passage of English-only 
amendments (Schildkraut 2001) and Indian gaming laws (Boehmke et al. 2006). Ballot 
measures frequently induce greater issue awareness and stimulate informed public 
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participation that reshapes the political environment over time (Tolbert, McNeal, and 
Smith 2003, 23; Matsusaka 2004, Ch. 7). 
 It is precisely this influence on the political environment that scholars have 
referred to as the “educative effect” of citizen legislation (Howe 1915; Smith and Tolbert 
2004; 2006; 2007). The findings presented here join the host of extant literature, offering 
a resounding ‘yes’ to a longstanding question of political science; do citizen legislators 
move us closer to a state of good governance?  
The beneficial contributions of direct democracy often go unseen; particularly, 
when we limit the focus of our studies to singular government outputs (see Figure 4). 
However, when we pan back to examine the influences of direct legislation on the 
governing process, it emerges as a quality input into the political system, an asset rather 
than a liability. When citizens act in the capacity of legislators, “it can lead to constant 
discussion, to a deeper interest in government, and to a psychological conviction that a 
government is in effect the people themselves. And perhaps this is the greatest gain of 
all” (Howe 1915; Smith and Tolbert 2006, 36). This study serves as additional evidence 
in support of the contributions made by direct legislation and for the citizens that have 
taken the initiative on the road to good governance. 
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APPENDIX A: VOTER TURNOUT MODEL 
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 Voter turnout remains one of the most heavily studied topics in political science. 
Many of the studies construct elaborate empirical models with a multitude of explanatory 
variables. However, there are five independent variables that stand out as the core of most 
studies: educational attainment of the electorate, difficulty of voter registration, state 
unemployment rate, political culture, and interparty competition. Table 8 outlines the 
regression output for voter turnout.54  
Higher educational attainment within a state is strongly associated with greater 
political participation, including turning out to vote (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). 
Table 8 demonstrates that as the percent of a state’s residents that have a bachelor’s 
degree or higher increases, voter turnout rises as well, and is significant at p < .001. As a 
state moves from the minimum educational attainment value that appears in the data 
(2.2%) to the maximum value (35%) turnout increases by nearly ten percentage points.  
Moreover, as citizen face greater difficulty in registering to vote, they are less 
likely to turnout come election day regardless of educational attainment (Jackson 1996). 
Difficulty of voter registration is popularly operationalized by the number of days before 
an election in which registration closes (Jackson 1996). Table 8 evidences a strong 
negative relationship between difficulty of voter registration and voter turnout (p < .01). 
Difficulty of voter registration also has the capacity to lower turnout by ten percentage 
points over the course of its full range of values that appear in the dataset.  
 Unemployment rates for each of the states are acquired from the State Politics and 
Policy Data Center.55 Unemployment is measured as the percent of a state’s total 
employment pool that is currently out of work (State Politics and Policy Data Center 
                                                 
54 It is noteworthy that each of the variables in the appendices are operationalized and measured identically 
in the appendices are they are in the research design. 
55 Data is available at the SPPQ website: http://www.ipsr.ku.edu/SPPQ/links.shtml. 
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2008). It is expected that greater unemployment is typically indicative of poor economic 
conditions at the state and local level. In times of economic trouble or uncertainty, voter 
turnout has been known to increase as the electorate rallies with renewed political interest 
in government policy (Arceneaux 2003). Table 8 offers support for such a relationship (p 
< .01). 
 Political culture is also thought to weigh heavily on voter turnout (Elazar 1966; 
Hanson 1980). Specifically, Daniel Elazar’s (1966) conceptualization of a “traditionalist” 
culture is a pertinent control. Traditionalist cultures congregate disproportionately in the 
south and are typically marked by less efficacious electorates that turnout to vote less 
frequently than the national average (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 1969; Johnson 1976; 
Layman and Carmines 1997). Therefore, there is strong reason to expect lower voter 
turnout among these states than with the non-traditionalist counterpart (Johnson 1976). 
Indeed, a state that may be classified as having a traditionalistic political culture has, on 
average, nearly eight percentage points lower voter turnout than a nontraditionalistic 
state. 
 Finally, interparty competition is also thought to be a theoretically important 
mover of voter turnout (King 1994; Jackson 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). 
Interparty competition is ultimately an issue of mobilization. Consequently, its positive 
coefficient in Table 8 is consistent with the literature. However, given the simplified 
operationalization of the variable, its significance may be muted.56  
The following model is run: 
                                                 
56 The sophisticated measurement of choice, the Major Party Index (Ceasar and Saldin 2005) is not 
available for the 1980s. Moreover, the Ranney index is calculated to include a measure of party 
competition over time. Thus, this traditional index would not have allowed for much variation within the 
variable as it is available on a per decade basis. 
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Voter Turnout = (Constant) + b1 (State Education Level) 
               - b2 (Difficulty of Voter Registration) + b3 (State Unemployment) 
                          - b4 (Traditionalist Political Culture) + b5 (Interparty Competition)+ et 
 
 
Table 8: Voter Turnout Simplified Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variables Exp. Sign Model  
Percent Pop. College Graduates + 
.003*** 
(.001) 
Difficulty of Voter Registration - 
.002** 
(.001) 
Unemployment Rate + 
.005** 
(.002) 
Traditionalist Political Culture - 
 
-.074*** 
(-0.014) 
Interparty Competition + 
.01 
(.02) 
   
   
N  550 
Wald Chi2  8226.70*** 
R2   .25 
 Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis. 
 *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 
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APPENDIX B: YEAR-END RESERVES MODEL 
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A state’s fiscal health is the result of a myriad of social, political, and economic 
conditions in any particular year. However, a simplified theoretical model posits that 
year-end reserves are a function of government liberalism, state debt per capita, state 
unemployment, and legislative professionalism.  
 Government liberalism is operationalized by the Government Ideology Index (see 
Berry et al. 1998), which ranges from 0, indicating conservatism to 100 which represents 
liberalism. The index is constructed by weighting the policy stances and subsequent 
interest group ratings of each state’s major parties and congressional candidates. 
Logically, it is expected that more liberal governments tend to spend more (Berry et al. 
1998). Consequently, there will likely be fewer year-end reserves among these states.  
 Furthermore, it is proposed that greater state debt per capita will also play a role 
in reducing year-end reserves. On the surface it would seem that states bearing greater 
debt would apportion more annual revenue to paying down its indebtedness. However, as 
a control variable for year-end reserves, as a state’s debt load increases during the year, it 
represents reserves that are not being used to pay down debt. Thus, the positive albeit 
insignificant relationship in Table 9 is expected. 
 Regarding state unemployment, it is expected that higher state unemployment will 
engender either increased government spending or reduced revenue. Consequently, 
government may opt to compensate those disadvantaged by the economic downturn or to 
provide tax relief to individual home or business owners during times of high 
unemployment. Table 9 outlines this relationship. Year-end reserves tend to fall 
significantly (p < .001) as unemployment within a state rises. 
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State legislative professionalism is expected to negatively influence year-end 
reserves. While, more professionalized legislatures are not necessarily more liberal, they 
do tend to spend more funds annually on public policies, specifically greater welfare 
spending (Squire 1992; 1993; Banducci 1998; King 2000; Maestas 2000; Bowman and 
Kearney 2002). Indeed, as a state’s Squire index value moves from 0 to 1, year-end 
reserves fall significantly (p < .001). 
The following regression analysis is run: 
Year-end Reserves = (Constant) – b1 (Government Liberalism)  
                       - b2 (State Debt Per Capita) - b3 (State Unemployment Rate)  
                                 - b4 (State Legislative Professionalism) 
     
Table 9: Year-end Reserves Simplified Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variables Exp. Sign Model  
Government Liberalism - 
 
- .01 
(.01) 
State Debt Per Capita + 
 
.001 
(.001) 
Unemployment Rate - 
 
- 1.29*** 
(.17) 
State Legislative Professionalism - 
 
- 14.95*** 
(3.94) 
 
N  
 
550 
Wald Chi2  165.01*** 
R2  .13 
 Cell entries are random effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 
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APPENDIX C: STATE INTEREST GROUP DIVERSITY MODEL 
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 The diversity of a state’s interest group population is linked to the notion of more 
expansive interest representation. With a noted class bias in political participation, having 
a more diverse array of hands vying for public policies marks a step towards better 
governance (Schattschneider 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). The category of 
citizen groups is inherently miscellaneous (Geber 1999; Braunstein 2002; Boehmke 
2002; 2005a). Citizen groups may represent moral issues, law enforcement, taxation, 
education, or environmental concerns. Consequently, as citizen groups become a larger 
proportion of a state’s interest group population, it may be said that the interest group 
system is diversifying. 
Within the simplified model in Table 10, two explanatory and two control 
variables are regressed against the percent of a state’s interest group system that is 
comprised of active citizen groups. The first factor considered is gross state product 
squared (Gray and Lowery 1994; 1996). While the dependent variable in this model is 
calculated from the raw data of total citizen groups active within a state, the two must be 
differentiated. Interest group diversity is a gauge of how balanced a state’s interest group 
system is between economic and citizen representation (Boehmke 2005a). However, the 
ESA model of interest group density necessitates a control for state “energy” (Gray and 
Lowery 1996). Energy is represented by gross state product squared. Without the 
resources needed to sustain interest groups within a state, both economic and citizen 
group numbers will decline. The positive and significant coefficient in Table 10 supports 
the findings of Gray and Lowery (1994; 1996). 
A second control variable is whether or not a state may be classified as having a 
traditionalistic political culture (Elazar 1966). Such states have electorates that are, on 
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average, less involved or aware of politics and public policies (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 
1969). From this one may expect a less expansive scope of conflict and interest 
representation among states with traditionalistic political cultures. While the regression 
output in Table 10 outlines a negative association between traditionalistic political culture 
and state interest group diversity, the relationship is not statistically significant. 
As single party control of the state legislative and governorship gives way to 
divided government, it is likely that a more expansive slate of interests will make the 
political agenda (Downs 1957; Mayhew 1991). Consequently, within states with divided 
government there may simply be less need for outside mobilization strategies such as 
citizen group formation, as government may represent a more diverse array of issues and 
concerns under divided government. The significant negative coefficient in Table 10 
provides support for this hypothesis. 
Finally, states with ideologically extreme electorates will likely have more diverse 
interest group systems as a function of greater activism within the state (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 2003). That is, coherent and extreme ideology is associated with more political 
activity on average. Ideological citizenries are efficacious and active in the political 
system. The significant and positive coefficient for citizen ideological extremism in Table 
10 supports this claim. An increase of one standard deviation in a citizenry’s ideological 
extremism is associated with a two percentage point increase in the diversity of the state’s 
active interest group system. The following model is run: 
State Interest Group Diversity = (constant) + b1 (Gross State Product)  
- b2 (Divided Government) – b3 (Traditionalist Culture)  
+ b4 (Citizen Ideological Extremism) 
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Table 10: State Interest Group Diversity Simplified Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variables Exp. Sign Model  
Gross State Product Squared + 
4.14e-13*** 
(5.53e-14) 
Traditionalist Political Culture - 
- .01 
(.006) 
Divided Government - 
- .01* 
(.00) 
Citizen Ideological Extremism + 
.02*** 
(.005) 
   
N  515 
Wald Chi2  176.09*** 
R2   .20 
 Cell entries are random effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 
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APPENDIX D:  GOVERNMENT-CITIZEN IDEOLOGICAL 
DISTANCE MODEL 
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 In representative democracies, the issue of substantive representation remains at 
the forefront of political research. That is, the ideology of the electorate and its entailing 
policy concerns should generally be reflected in its elected representatives (Burke [1770] 
1999).57 Thus, ideological distance between the government and its citizen should be 
minimal. Greater ideological distance is seen as detrimental even for Burkean-trustee 
adherents. Elites are still able to craft policy in accordance with their expertise, provided 
it is comparable to the broader ideological values of those who elect them. 
Representatives with an ideology that is radically divergent from their constituencies runs 
counter to the idea of representative democracy.  
States with professionalized legislatures should have, on average, less ideological 
distance between the government and the citizenry. Legislative professionalism entails 
increased government capacity and is linked to the fostering of constituency services 
(Hibbing 1986; Fiorina 1989; 1999; Maestas 2000; Bowman and Kearney 2002; Squire 
2007). Overall, professionalized legislative bodies are more attentive and in tune with 
their constituencies out of the desire for re-election or progressive ambition (Maestas 
2000; Squire 2007). Table 11 show a significant (p < .05) and negative relationship the 
dependent variable and legislative professionalism. A movement from 0 to 1, that is from 
an amateur to professional legislative body, lowers the average ideological distance value 
by over 10 points. 
 Studies to date have found that state legislative term limits may actually 
exacerbate the problem of ideological distance (Moncrief and Thompson 2001; Bowman 
                                                 
57 It should be noted that this does not entail representatives following in lock-step with public opinion; 
only that the broader ideology of their constituency is effectively represented. In this way, the desired 
minimal ideological distance between government and the citizenry holds for both the delegate and trustee 
models of representation. 
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and Kearney 2002; Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006). Term limits may in fact proffer the 
power of interest groups who understand the workings of a political system better than 
the incoming freshman legislators, who must rely upon these groups for information and 
contacts (Moncrief and Thompson 2001). The positive and significant coefficient in 
Table 11 evidences a modest relationship between term limits and ideological distance 
between the government and its citizenry.  
 Another key variable to be included is citizen ideological extremism. An 
ideological electorate is also one that is more likely to keep government in line with its 
own ideology (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). Table 11 outlines that as a citizenry moves 
up one standard deviation in ideological extremism, the state’s ideological distance score 
falls by nearly 5 points (p < .001). The idea behind citizen ideological extremism is that a 
more active and aware electorate is more likely to keep its representative system 
representative. 
 Finally, political culture is controlled. Evidence suggests that government 
responsiveness and representativeness may also be a feature of whether or not a state’s 
culture is traditionalistic (Elazar 1966; Sharkansky 1969). These states possess 
electorates that are, on average, less informed and less involved in the political process 
(Elazar 1966). Therefore, there is simply less likelihood that ideological distance will be 
punished or corrected during elections. The following regression analysis is run: 
 
Ideological Distance = (constant) – b1 (State Legislative Professionalism)  
 + b2 (Term Limits) – b3 (Citizen Ideol. Extremism) 
- b4 (Traditionalist Political Culture) 
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Table 11: Government-Citizen Ideological Dist. Simplified Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variables Exp. Sign Model  
State Legislative Professionalism - 
- 10.43* 
(4.74) 
State Legislative Term Limits + 
4.00** 
(1.31) 
Citizen Ideol. Extremism - 
- 4.53*** 
(.77) 
Traditionalist Political Culture + 
.70 
(1.38) 
   
   
N  550 
Wald Chi2  521.43*** 
R2   .09 
Cell entries are random effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 
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APPENDIX E: ALTERNATE GOOD GOVERNANCE MODEL 
(Dummy Variable Regression) 
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 Traditional models of direct legislation employ a dummy variable as the key 
explanatory variable, capturing whether or not the initiative process is available in a 
particular state (Tatalovich 1995; Gerber 1996a; 1996b; Tolbert and Hero 1998; Zavodny 
2000; Schildkraut 2001; Boehmke 2005a; 2005b). While this provides for a clean 
empirical test, it may muffle the true explanatory weight of citizen legislation on two 
accounts. First, operationalizing direct legislation as a dummy variable will likely mute 
the potential effects upon the substantive component of good governance. Institutional 
availability of the initiative does not necessarily entail use. Consequently, a state may be 
coded 1 for having the process and yet its biennial ballot measure count may be zero. 
With no actual measures on the ballot, the substantive influences are not picked up by the 
model. Second, the dummy variable typically does not include popular referendums. 
Until recently, the Initiative and Referendum Institute collected data only on citizen 
initiatives. Historically, the initiative process has been the main focus of direct legislation 
research; and rightly so, as most ballot measures in the states are in initiatives. However, 
ignoring popular referendums, which are by definition citizen initiated statutory reform, 
may also distort empirical models. Simply put, when discussing citizen legislation, all 
citizen initiated legislation must be considered. 
 As a validity check on this study’s holistic governance model, the effort is made 
to substitute this traditional dummy variable for the ballot measure count. Table 12 
contains the GLS-regression output for the alternative model. No variables have been 
changed except for the key explanatory variable (biennial ballot measure count). 
Reassuringly, none of the variables change signs, and few change significance levels. The 
R-squared value remains constant, and statistically, nothing is lost. 
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Table 12: Good Governance Dummy Regression, 1980-2000 
 
                  Variables                              Expected Sign                           Model 
Key Explanatory 
     Initiative available in state?                         +                                      13.84** 
                                                                                                                   (5.09) 
Institutional  Influences 
     Legislative Professionalism                          -                                  - 32.56** 
                                                                                                                (18.02) 
     Interparty Competition                                 +                                      3.73 
                                                                                                                  (6.89) 
     Difficulty of Voter registration                     -                                      - .19 
                                                                                                                    (.19)  
     Divided Government                                    +                                    22.67*** 
                                                                                                                  (1.91) 
     State Legislative Term Limits                       -                                    - 3.08 
                                                                                                                  (3.12) 
Ideological Considerations 
     State Government Liberalism                       -                                     - .13** 
                                                                                                                   (.05) 
     Citizen Ideological Extremism                     +                                      3.38* 
                                                                                                                  (2.17) 
Demographic Controls 
     % College Grads in State                             +                                      1.17*** 
                                                                                                                   (.34) 
     Traditional Political Culture                         -                                   - 16.75** 
                                                                                                                  (5.59) 
    Gross State Product-squared                        +                                      7.92e-11*** 
                                                                                                                  (1.57e-11)   
     State Debt Per Capita                                   -                                       - .01*** 
                                                                                                                    (.001) 
     Unemployment                                             -                                       - .19 
                                                                                                                    (.51) 
N                                                                                                             516.00 
Wald Chi2                                                                                                    241.87*** 
R2                                                                                                                  .46 
      Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
       *** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test) 
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 Thus, when considered holistically, citizen legislation is a positive and significant 
influence upon a state’s SGGI score regardless of operationalization. This is another 
reminder of the importance of considering governance as a whole. When examined 
piecemeal, findings are fickle and models tend to lack robustness as has been the case in 
much of the direct legislation literature to date. This may at least partly explain the 
conflicting assertions of initiative scholars (see Matsusaka 1995; Gerber 1996b; Lascher, 
Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Hagen, Lascher, and Camobreco 2001).58  
 The traditional initiative dummy variable only becomes problematic once the 
SGGI is broken into its two theoretical components. Tables 13 and 14 outline bivariate 
regression output for procedural and substantive good governance. The dummy variable 
is substituted for the ballot measure count operationalization. Table 13 evidences that the 
availability of the initiative process alone appears to improve inclusiveness and 
procedural governance. Boehmke (2005a) and Gerber (1999) suggest that the institutional 
presence of the initiative is enough to induce the formation of citizen groups and efficacy 
within the electorate. Simply knowing the option for direct legislation is available, 
appears to benefit procedural governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 Michael Hagen, Edward Lascher, John Camobreco, and Steven Rochlin (2001) authored a series of 
articles that disputed the findings of John G. Matsusaka (1995; 2001; 2004) and Elisabeth Gerber (1996b) 
on both the financial effects of direct legislation as well as its relationship to public opinion and 
governmental responsiveness. Because such conflictual results exist, subsequent authors have tended to cite 
the team whose evidence supports their research agendas. 
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Table 13: Procedural Good Governance, Bivar. Dummy Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient 
Initiative available in state? + 
   15.29** 
(5.36) 
   
N                       516 
Wald Chi2   8.14** 
R2                       0.11 
Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test) 
 
 However, as predicted, the influence of citizen legislation is effectively mute on 
the substantive component of the SGGI. Table 14 contains the bivariate regression output 
for substantive good governance. The coefficient (2.39) is small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant (p < .24). Because there is no guarantee that actual measures are 
making it to the ballot every two years, the initiative dummy variable acts as a poor 
explanatory variable in this instance.  
 
Table 14: Substantive Good Governance, Bivar. Dummy Regression, 1980-2000 
 
Variable Exp. Sign Coefficient 
Initiative available in state? +   
 2.39 
                     (3.30) 
     
N                         550 
Wald Chi2                        974.59*** 
R2                         0.01 
Cell entries are Random-effects GLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < .001; ** < .01; * < .05; t < .10 (one-tailed test) 
 
 These auxiliary regression analyses demonstrate the robustness of this study’s 
main holistic model and key explanatory variable (Table 4). Citizen legislation does 
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appear to be positively and significantly associated with quality governance, even when 
the index is split into its two theoretical parts. However, when the traditional dummy 
variable is employed rather than a biennial ballot measure count, its effect upon the 
substantive component of the SGGI is muffled. Notably, when governance is considered 
as a whole, either KEV operationalization holds its significant and positive association 
with the dependent variable. This offers support for both the use of a state’s ballot 
measure count as key explanatory variable, and emphasizes the empirical importance of a 
more holistic conception of governance.  
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